Scoring the Counterinsurgency

This post features commentary on the following editorial:
http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=267664846901795

This editorial rehashes one of the basic premises of a counterinsurgency: tactical success does not equal strategic victory. But if the cynical, manipulative liberal media reported "the truth" (i.e. our ongoing tactical success) and did their part to support the troops, then we could sustain the political will to win the war.

I disagree with the editorial's wholehearted blame of the media. While there are many in the media who use their position to push an agenda, they also respond to demand. They have a readership and they know their market; they know what sells and what people want to read. The American public is interested in American lives affected by the war, for good or for ill, and that's why you see a preponderance of reporting on American tragedies. The administration and military leaders are equally at fault for bungling public expectations and feelings for the war. In one sense, an insurgency is a long-term siege of a nation's political will. When President Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in May of 2003 to declare "Mission Accomplished" to the nation and world, he opened wide a gate for the besieging terrorists. Our wall of credibility sustained a lot of damage. Manipulating patriotism to gain support by sugar-coating, euphemizing, or ignoring what's really going on will eventually backfire, because people do not like being made fools of themselves--it's simple disrespect. For example, not allowing generals to use the word "insurgency" to describe the increasing violence back in 2003 only provoked skepticism and cynicism later on. Anthony Cordesman, a military scholar says this: "...there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn't a matter of a cynical media or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. By the time we finish "spinning," we deprive ourselves of credibility, domestically and internationally." I think what you see in the media is part backlash against this loss of credibility. A classic recent example of this: Senator McCain's publicity stunt two months ago in a Baghdad market. Once the front-runner in the Republican party, since that incident McCain's ratings have dropped.

The other problem with the editorial is their complete reliance on metrics. Keeping score is an over-simplification of the fight. Our task is not to kill more terrorists than they kill Soldiers--there will always be more terrorists. Our job is to protect the people, foster capable and legitimate local security forces to augment and eventually replace undermanned US positions, mentor the legitimate local government to provide rule of law and essential services, and help the local Iraqi government and security forces win popular support to forge a populace resistant to insurgents. At the strategic level, we must help reconcile sectarian rivalry that has stymied government efficacy and wilted public perception and establish government institutions to make things work. Time and time again I've seen bureaucratic bean counters lose the forest for the trees over metrics, stats, and yellow gumballs on PowerPoint slides. I'm not advocating doing away with all metrics, because they are useful and play a role, just consider them in context. In its rush to blame, this editorial fails to keep the big picture in perspective. A great example of this is how the editorial uses numbers to expose the lie that life was better under Saddam. I'm here to say that life was a lot better for Iraqis under Saddam. I know because they tell us this all the time. The fact is those stats are meaningless to your average Iraqi who's dealing with 120 degree heat with no A/C, and thinks that the Shia government has abandoned him, or Sunni car bombs are disrupting his electricity--who is on the fence toward supporting the local police or the local insurgent. My point is that in order to win we're dealing with a precarious, subjective balance of human perception and popular will, which is extremely difficult to quantify. Killing hundreds of terrorists in Al Anbar didn't get us anywhere until we managed to gain the popular support of the local tribes, who brought security to the people, whose actions proved to the people that they offered a better future than dismal uncertainty of random violence. Our success in Ramadi had nothing to do with a body count. "Keeping score" loses sight of what we really need to accomplish, and won't necessarily get us any closer to that objective.

Ugandans

This past month, a troop of Ugandan security guards and their war-profiteering US handlers took Camp Ramadi by storm. It's impossible to get upset with the Ugandans, even though they are very serious and professional about their mission of denying everyone who forgot their ID card that day access to the PX, dining facility, helipad, gym, Camp Ramadi R/C car derby raceway, and other facilities inside the camp. Their broad, serious faces break into such big grins that I can't get upset at them for the inconvenience in the name of force protection they've brought to our lives.

Yet despite their cheeriest smiles, I can't help getting upset. Why are they here? I can't think of any event that triggered the security lockdown on Camp Ramadi. They have to be expensive, because there are a lot of them, not counting the additional living space and infrastructure upgrades we've had to make. There's enough pointless waste around here, I don't like being reminded three or four times daily about the the bundles of taxpayer money that's being dutifully dumped into this thing like landscapers jostle bucketloads of leaves into a leaf shredder. You may think all this money is going to the war, but it's pretty amazing where a lot of it ends up.

SIGACTs

SIGACT is military jargon for significant activity. Like most Army acronyms, it can be juggled to mean different things and morph into various parts of speech. A SIGACT is a concise report of pertinent facts concerning any enemy-focused event that occurs throughout the day. They range from an isolated, harmless sniper shot to a car bomb that kills 20. They can be good news, such as the safe discovery and neutralization of an IED or enemy weapons cache; but are mostly bad, like a successful IED attack that kills a Soldier or Iraqi policeman. Writing them is a critical duty of the tactical operations center--the task force command and control center.


Yesterday, June 8th, there were only two SIGACTs in all of Ramadi and the greater surrounding area. This is astounding. A year ago, Ramadi was a lost cause. It was probably the most dangerous, most lawless city in the world. It routinely grabbed the highest percentage of SIGACTs throughout all Iraq. Yesterday, however, some Marines downtown found a rusty artillery shell and a belt of ammo under a trash pile with a metal detector. Then on the outskirts there was a truck bomb that struck a checkpoint on the highway and badly wounded some Iraqi policemen. But after that, not a single IED exploded, and nobody was shot at, and nothing else was reported. Anywhere. The small cache type finds are still somewhat common--forgotten remnants of the lawless days when insurgents ruled the city. They had weapon and ammunition stocks hidden everywhere to facilitate attacks. They would burst into the homes of citizens and stick their AKs in the faces of the kids to make the father bury artillery shells in the backyard--and keep them from telling us about them. When the Iraqi police finally rolled in and kicked the insurgents out, they brought in these caches by the Ford F-350 truckload. Now the insurgents are out of the city, they've stepped up their VBIED campaign.


Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices--"vee-bids". Now that the IP and the people who love them deny insurgents access to the city, the terrorists changed their tack. Now they infiltrate massive truck bombs targeting innocents and infrastructure. They like to add big tanks of chlorine, but that's just a headline-grab; the chlorine that doesn't evaporate just gives some folks a sore throat for while and gives the media something to yak about. Last week they went for an Iraqna cell phone tower, but ended up destroying five homes and wrecking a few families. The one three days ago that hit a highway patrol station a few klicks outside the base was so large that the concussion knocked down ceiling tiles and filled the on-base gym with dust--it destroyed my workout and wounded some patrolmen (one lost a leg), but luckily no one was killed except the driver.

These attacks are senseless. They're like the Nazi buzz-bombs over London at the end of WWII. A big middle finger to the people of Ramadi who are starting to enjoy water and electricity again for the first time in years. They're an Al Qaeda ploy to prove to the people that they can still control their lives. The city is getting wise, though, and a new rule by the mayor and other tactics will hopefully push these attacks further outside the densely populated areas. It is easy to see how willing the people are to suffer major inconveniences for security--waiting in long lines at checkpoints, Iraqi Army and police clearing their homes again: they don't want another VBIED to detonate in their local market. Impinges on certain civil liberties are easy to bear when the alternative is rampant violence and arbitrary destruction.

But now, the people are starting to come to terms with the uneasy peace over Ramadi right now. A few days ago our neighborhood of Ramadi had their first soccer tournament on a new field. City municipal workers are coming out of the woodwork and fixing water pipes and electrical lines on their own now that they won't get sniped at, kidnapped, or beheaded for doing so. It's kind of unfortunate we don't have positive SIGACTs: official reports that tabulate every time some kids had a soccer game without getting offered 10 bucks and some candy to put a bomb in a hole where humvees drive, or when we finally removed all the concrete barriers and concertina wire barring all the storefronts (now open) along a former IED alley, or when the municipal workers tested the local water tower and found out--amazingly--that it had no bullet holes and didn't leak like a giant colander on stilts. But that might make things too hectic in the TOC again--no one wants to go back to the time when there were 40-50 SIGACTs per day.

Big Red One

I have spent my entire, brief Army career in the 1st Infantry Division--the "Big Red One." Though I've had brief regrets about not being in an Airborne or Alpine unit, I am generally proud of being in the 1st Infantry Division. We have an illustrious history starting back in WWI, and we are the Army's oldest, continually serving combat unit. When the division headquarters moved back to Germany in 1996, they adopted the Army's Class A unit patch--a maraschino cherry red '1' on a shield crest of foliage green for the normal duty (camouflage) uniform to signify that we were an "expeditionary force" (ie. serving overseas). This was an anomaly; no other unit in the Army had this privilege (everyone else wears a subdued patch to fit the camouflage). When the rest of the division moved back to the States last year, my brigade, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, remained the surviving expeditionary force, and we proudly kept our Big Red One patches on.


Last month, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army apparently caught wind that we were the lone brigade in the Army wearing Class A patches. He sent an indignant order down to the rogue brigade to cease wearing the offending patch on 1 June. Now, figuring two new subdued "Big Black One" patches for each Soldier in the brigade (a few thousand), at roughly 5-7 dollars a patch, this decision will cost US taxpayers roughly $30,000 to supply the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with the authorized patch--not to mention the pre-deployment investment of red one patches on a field of teal to match the Army's new high-tech digital camouflage uniform. The thing is, roughly six months from now we're going to "re-flag" as a different unit under the Army's plan to reorganize forces in Germany, and put on a brand new patch. The other thing is, the Army supply system couldn't move fast enough to match the fiat, so now we're patchless for the unforseeable future. If I'm lucky, I should get a big black one patch from the Army system as a souvenir before I leave Iraq.

To Survive or To Win?

There is a pervasive lack of understanding concerning the type of conflict we’re in among the junior leaders and soldiers fighting the war on the front lines, and this is absolutely not their fault. You can’t even put the onus on the chain of command or even the highest leaders of the military; though as time passes, pressure should mount on our senior military leaders for allowing ignorance and misconception to exist in our junior leaders, those on the ground calling the shots. This pervasive sentiment typically takes two forms: ignorance of the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, and a mistaken pessimism that certain Arabic cultural traits render all our idealistic efforts into a costly, pointless death grind. This mindset causes the majority of junior leaders and the Soldiers or Marines under them to care about only one thing: survival—not winning; maybe at best doing some good where they can, but not making lasting transitional changes. The issue is simply that junior leaders across the military are not prepared or properly trained for the type of war they are fighting.


In a recent mass-email home, a Lieutenant on the front lines wrote eloquently of the Ranger Creed, applying this tried and true Army maxim to his current situation, and yet it doesn't seem to fit: “We have no ‘Ranger objective.’” he wrote. “We have no hill to take, no terrain to dominate, no land which, once captured, will be safe haven for us.” He’s exactly right: there is no land to take. Enemy centers of gravity are not terrain, as they are in conventional, linear battle—they are rather complex and amorphous networks of people and information that mitigate our overwhelming firepower, and they are the nebulous, abstract mist of human attitudes and perceptions in the people. Of course there’s an objective, only it takes more than intestinal fortitude to conquer—it requires historical perspective, cultural understanding, patience, and cunning. And it will not be taken in battle; it will gradually, imperceptibly be achieved over the course of years. While it is one thing to talk glibly of the “nature of counterinsurgency,” it is an entirely different matter to train a soldier or marine how to fight one, to equip a leader with a contextual framework and cultural understanding to truly offensively prosecute a counterinsurgency. You don’t necessarily win in this war by firing your tank and taking a bunker, like every soldier and marine has been trained superbly to do—though those skills are important and do play a role. Instead, we are relying on junior leaders to figure it out without the rigorous training in this other type of warfare. What did my unit do immediately prior to deployment? Ship out Grafenwoehr Training Area for two weeks to fire our tanks, artillery cannons, and Bradley fighting vehicles at the range. What do we really need? A few Staff Sergeants who can de-escalate a situation with some cultural savvy and knowledge of a few key Arabic phrases, and a Lieutenant armed with some nuanced negotiating skills.

Many junior leaders (and others) believe that Iraq is hopeless because of various cultural, tribal, or religious traits. Can democracy succeed where “…forgiveness brings shame, and personal vengeance is justice?” as one Lieutenant put it. Maybe so, but I think what he’s describing is the human condition without the rule of law, not a tragic character flaw peculiar to the Arabs. This is a poverty and war stricken land—the people display a normal level of pathological victimization for a people crushed by a dictator whose oppressive yet relatively stable society and infrastructure was devastated by years of sanctions and an invasion of 70-ton tanks and unnumbered explosives. But the people thirst for justice, too, and rule of law is something they yearn for. It will take years, of course, but we're not helping by throwing our hands up and saying it can’t be done, denying it’s our problem, or harping about how this whole debacle was a mistake to begin with. Is each death of a US Servicemember an embarrassment to our nation's collective shortsightedness? That really remains to be seen. I suppose these deaths could very well become an embarrassment: not necessarily because the decision to invade was based on faulty intelligence, but probably due to our nation's insatiable fast-food desire to see success in terms of 2-4 year political intervals and an unwillingness to witness democracy at its bloody, turmoiled roots. We’re the 20th century looking back 200 years ago at ourselves, expecting them to catch up right now to where we’re at, and if they won’t, then let’s get out of dodge, because it’s no longer our responsibility.

To the military’s credit, leaders at all echelons are trying hard to fight this war the right way. Senior leaders have established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq, and the latest enemy tactics and current tactical scenarios have made their way into the military’s training centers; the Army has recently published a field manual for counterinsurgency, and the Marines have republished their classic Small Wars Manual that went forgotten during Vietnam. It may be too little too late. The counterinsurgency academy is focused at the battalion staff and company commander level and above, and does not yet integrate NCOs and junior leaders—those paying the toll every day. Scenario training is good for decisive tactical decision making, but doesn't equip a leader with the contextual understanding they need to be proactive prosecutors of this complex war, and to recognize the political significance of tactical decisions. Since the beginning of the war, leaders at all echelons have had one goal constantly in mind: bring their Soldiers home safely. Survival mode is easy—especially when confronted with the unknown. The tragedy is that survival mode is often counterproductive and not focused on facilitating an end to this interminable conflect.
Historically renowned for creativity and intrepidity in battle, hundreds of brave young leaders are figuring out on their own how to fight this war the right way. Unfortunately, relying on the creativity of insufficiently trained leaders is somewhat of a crapshoot. Some units get it, and see incredible success, such as the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi; all too often others don’t because they're too busy treading water, simply trying to survive.

Goat Grab

To get the Sheiks on your side, you must use tribal diplomacy: cigarettes, chai, chit-chat, long silences you might call awkward, communal goat platters. Negotiating a simple contract for some gravel back at the base is not a concise power-deal brokered in ten minutes. It involves copious small talk, cups of chai, and more cigarettes--then a few minutes of business, in low casual tones while lounging on a a plush pillow or two.

We go out to the Sheiks' compound and sit for hours, declining countless cigarettes and sipping cloying chai and acrid coffee. I especially like the coffee. The coffee server brings it out in an ornate samovar with two small cups, and makes the rounds to everyone. You get a small shot, like espresso. When you pass the cup back to the server you have to give it a little wiggle, which means no more, if you don't do the wiggle, they'll pour you another. Eventually they bring out the Quzi--giant platters of rice mounded with boiled goat and sheep parts, with layers of flat bread and bowls of savory tomato-based broth and vegetables. In a touching gesture of accomodation, they put our platter on a table instead of the floor and bring out spoons, but I am trying hard to eat properly with my hands. The trick is to first tear out the choice pieces of meat and maneuver them to your little corner of the platter. Then you tightly mound clumps of rice and meat together with your four fingers and scoop it up to your mouth, holding it in place with your thumb. It should hold together--although a few pieces still drop from my rice clumps. Then, sliding your fingers up to your mouth, you must deftly and cleanly push the mound into your mouth with the back of your thumb. True masters keep their unsanitary left hand behind their backs during the whole process (although it is allowed to use one's left hand to tear chunks of flatbread and also to dissassemble the meat), but I have to keep it under my right hand to catch rice bits and broth drippings. I'm getting better, though, and have even received some compliments. I plan to teach my kids this technique along with learning chopsticks, because it is a practical way to eat, and much of the world prefers it or uses it out of necessity. The other very tricky thing is scooping up broth with the flat bread--something I need to watch closely at the next goat grab. It is very polite to dig around in the middle of platter for a choice morsel and place it in your guest's territory on the platter; the highest of compliments to feed him that choice morsel yourself, or to slap it greasily in his palm. The Arabs make a good point about eating with one's hands, though: you never know for certain if the silverware is clean, but you do know for certain that your own hands are clean.

One reason we've been successful in our area is that my unit genuinely likes hanging out with these guys. We have a great rapport; my commander even holds a lot of wasta--or influence--with the Sheiks and the local community at large, and a main part of it is because we spend time at the goat grab. Politically, we have made a lot of headway with these Sheiks. Whole tribes in the area have gone from being insurgents to Iraqi Police. The Sheiks like having our commander over to banquets because they introduce him to their friends in the community in a familiar environment. The Sheiks told us they like to show their friends he's just a normal person too, and that he wants the best for the community.

Ramadi

This first entry is a testament to my procrastinating nature. I had grand plans to start this upon arriving in Kuwait for my second combat tour on August 5, 2006. It is now over nine months later. I am writing this blog at first for myself--mainly to keep up a writing discipline; secondly, because I know most of you reading this are interested in what is going on here, probably especially my part in it. As such, please feel free to ask me questions, as this will provide me some content.

In case you came about this blog indirectly, or don't know me personally, I am an Army Captain currently stationed at Camp Ramadi. I work for a Task Force (battalion-size element). Our area of operations encompasses a chunk of Ramadi as well as some surrounding countryside.

Following are some recent media articles that offer a decent perspective of what is currently going on in Ramadi. The first article lays out the general context for Ramadi's current success, while the others specifically mention my unit. My view of the situation is this: some courageous Iraqis decided to take responsibility, and luckily enough (for them and for us), we had an Army unit that was intelligent enough to embrace them, and wise enough to not mold the Iraqi's initiative into their own narrow image of what a pro-US Iraqi movement had to look like. The lion's share of the credit goes to the Al Anbar Salvation Council, however, as you'll see from the articles.

"An Army Colonel's gamble pays off in Iraq" - Jim Michaels, USA Today
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-colonel_N.htm

"In what was once one of Iraq's deadliest cities, local police curb violence" - Todd Pitman, AP
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20070413-1241-iraq-policingramadi.html

"In Ramadi, a ragtag solution with real results" - Chris Kraul, LA Times
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-kidcops7may07,0,4179768.story?coll=la-home-headlines

"Soldier and sheik like brothers against Al Qaeda" - Moni Basu, Atlanta Journal-Constitution
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/georgiansatwar/entries/2007/04/29/soldier_and_sheik_like_brother.html