To Survive or To Win?

There is a pervasive lack of understanding concerning the type of conflict we’re in among the junior leaders and soldiers fighting the war on the front lines, and this is absolutely not their fault. You can’t even put the onus on the chain of command or even the highest leaders of the military; though as time passes, pressure should mount on our senior military leaders for allowing ignorance and misconception to exist in our junior leaders, those on the ground calling the shots. This pervasive sentiment typically takes two forms: ignorance of the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, and a mistaken pessimism that certain Arabic cultural traits render all our idealistic efforts into a costly, pointless death grind. This mindset causes the majority of junior leaders and the Soldiers or Marines under them to care about only one thing: survival—not winning; maybe at best doing some good where they can, but not making lasting transitional changes. The issue is simply that junior leaders across the military are not prepared or properly trained for the type of war they are fighting.


In a recent mass-email home, a Lieutenant on the front lines wrote eloquently of the Ranger Creed, applying this tried and true Army maxim to his current situation, and yet it doesn't seem to fit: “We have no ‘Ranger objective.’” he wrote. “We have no hill to take, no terrain to dominate, no land which, once captured, will be safe haven for us.” He’s exactly right: there is no land to take. Enemy centers of gravity are not terrain, as they are in conventional, linear battle—they are rather complex and amorphous networks of people and information that mitigate our overwhelming firepower, and they are the nebulous, abstract mist of human attitudes and perceptions in the people. Of course there’s an objective, only it takes more than intestinal fortitude to conquer—it requires historical perspective, cultural understanding, patience, and cunning. And it will not be taken in battle; it will gradually, imperceptibly be achieved over the course of years. While it is one thing to talk glibly of the “nature of counterinsurgency,” it is an entirely different matter to train a soldier or marine how to fight one, to equip a leader with a contextual framework and cultural understanding to truly offensively prosecute a counterinsurgency. You don’t necessarily win in this war by firing your tank and taking a bunker, like every soldier and marine has been trained superbly to do—though those skills are important and do play a role. Instead, we are relying on junior leaders to figure it out without the rigorous training in this other type of warfare. What did my unit do immediately prior to deployment? Ship out Grafenwoehr Training Area for two weeks to fire our tanks, artillery cannons, and Bradley fighting vehicles at the range. What do we really need? A few Staff Sergeants who can de-escalate a situation with some cultural savvy and knowledge of a few key Arabic phrases, and a Lieutenant armed with some nuanced negotiating skills.

Many junior leaders (and others) believe that Iraq is hopeless because of various cultural, tribal, or religious traits. Can democracy succeed where “…forgiveness brings shame, and personal vengeance is justice?” as one Lieutenant put it. Maybe so, but I think what he’s describing is the human condition without the rule of law, not a tragic character flaw peculiar to the Arabs. This is a poverty and war stricken land—the people display a normal level of pathological victimization for a people crushed by a dictator whose oppressive yet relatively stable society and infrastructure was devastated by years of sanctions and an invasion of 70-ton tanks and unnumbered explosives. But the people thirst for justice, too, and rule of law is something they yearn for. It will take years, of course, but we're not helping by throwing our hands up and saying it can’t be done, denying it’s our problem, or harping about how this whole debacle was a mistake to begin with. Is each death of a US Servicemember an embarrassment to our nation's collective shortsightedness? That really remains to be seen. I suppose these deaths could very well become an embarrassment: not necessarily because the decision to invade was based on faulty intelligence, but probably due to our nation's insatiable fast-food desire to see success in terms of 2-4 year political intervals and an unwillingness to witness democracy at its bloody, turmoiled roots. We’re the 20th century looking back 200 years ago at ourselves, expecting them to catch up right now to where we’re at, and if they won’t, then let’s get out of dodge, because it’s no longer our responsibility.

To the military’s credit, leaders at all echelons are trying hard to fight this war the right way. Senior leaders have established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq, and the latest enemy tactics and current tactical scenarios have made their way into the military’s training centers; the Army has recently published a field manual for counterinsurgency, and the Marines have republished their classic Small Wars Manual that went forgotten during Vietnam. It may be too little too late. The counterinsurgency academy is focused at the battalion staff and company commander level and above, and does not yet integrate NCOs and junior leaders—those paying the toll every day. Scenario training is good for decisive tactical decision making, but doesn't equip a leader with the contextual understanding they need to be proactive prosecutors of this complex war, and to recognize the political significance of tactical decisions. Since the beginning of the war, leaders at all echelons have had one goal constantly in mind: bring their Soldiers home safely. Survival mode is easy—especially when confronted with the unknown. The tragedy is that survival mode is often counterproductive and not focused on facilitating an end to this interminable conflect.
Historically renowned for creativity and intrepidity in battle, hundreds of brave young leaders are figuring out on their own how to fight this war the right way. Unfortunately, relying on the creativity of insufficiently trained leaders is somewhat of a crapshoot. Some units get it, and see incredible success, such as the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi; all too often others don’t because they're too busy treading water, simply trying to survive.