Military strategist Max Boot has a lucid and sobering article in Commentary Magazine about the possibilities for our continued involvement in Iraq:
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10920&page=all
I personally fully agree with his conclusions from a strategic perspective, and the optimist in me along with what I've experienced first-hand in Ramadi believes it is our best shot and also even possible. It seems to me Mr Boot charts the best course of any commentator thus far, even if he does so by drawing out the wretched alternatives to the surge and the current strategy. However, from my perspective, I'm not so sure he has adequately addressed the strain on the military--especially the Army. From what I've seen, most junior officers are already getting out. Fifteen month deployments are difficult to bear for equipment and personnel, especially in a counterinsurgency where tangible results are nearly impossible to quantify, and a tactical success may not guarantee your buddy won't die in a suicide vest attack the next day. For any soldier you might find who wants to stay and "finish the job," you'll find another simply trying to figure out what that job is he is trying to finish, or another who is just trying to survive another day.
I confess I have cognitive dissonance about the war. Though I think we must stay the course and finish what we started, I surely don't want that person finishing the job to be me if I can help it.
Monday, September 3, 2007
Saturday, September 1, 2007
Safety is Our #1 Concern
Everyone on Camp Ramadi is feeling a lot more safe today. A number of initiatives have been established recently that have noticeably improved base security. The base management unit has been setting up checkpoints around Camp Ramadi to make sure people are wearing their seat belts and not speeding--and also making sure people are wearing their flak vest and Kevlar helmets while driving in humvees from their barracks to the Post Exchange or laundry point on the camp. A lot of Soldiers and Marines hadn't been doing that, but this initiative will truly ensure that those accidents that never happened previously won't occur in the future either. One unit was stopped for speeding while taking a casualty to the medical clinic; they hopefully learned the error of their ways. Their carelessness could have easily made a bad situation much worse.
Family and friends back home can rest assured knowing their loved ones are safer than ever thanks to the scrupulous tax dollar investments toward force protection upgrades made in the past month. Hundreds of thick concrete barriers now line the roads around post to keep the humvees from veering off into the thick dust. Dust clouds can reduce visibility in an instant and make you cough. A few of these countless barriers also protect a couple vital structures from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. Although impossible, it can be conceived that one of these vehicles and drivers could pass completely undetected through the triple tiered base entrance security checks and gates.
Lastly, I feel palpably more at ease in our camp dining facility after yesterday. All non-Department of Defense personnel (Arabs and Indians) now have their own entrance line at the dining facility where they are individually searched by the ubiquitous Ugandans. Even though our unit interpreters endanger their lives daily alongside the troops, have been shot by snipers, been blown up by IEDs, had their families threatened and harassed, provided first aid for wounded Soldiers, and so on, when they get on post, you simply can't trust them--even after having undergone extensive background checks, routine security screening interviews, and receiving color-coded access badges. When I saw how many pocket knives the guards had confiscated in the first day alone I was flabbergasted. Fifty of these Sri Lankan laundry workers and Jordanian interpreters were carrying concealed weapons right under our noses! That many men could have easily overpowered me and my 9mm Beretta should I have been the lone Soldier dining with dozens of suddenly fanatical contractors armed with whittling knives. Even some of the Iraqi interpreters I know had the umbrage to complain to me about the safety measures, so I set them straight. They had no gratitude for the vast improvement to their own personal safety. I personally think we could improve our situation even more by requiring all Muslims on base to sew green crescents onto their shirt sleeves. Then I could sleep just a bit sweeter at night.
Safety is our number one concern here on Camp Ramadi. Rest assured your tax money is put to good use; your family members are secure.
Family and friends back home can rest assured knowing their loved ones are safer than ever thanks to the scrupulous tax dollar investments toward force protection upgrades made in the past month. Hundreds of thick concrete barriers now line the roads around post to keep the humvees from veering off into the thick dust. Dust clouds can reduce visibility in an instant and make you cough. A few of these countless barriers also protect a couple vital structures from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. Although impossible, it can be conceived that one of these vehicles and drivers could pass completely undetected through the triple tiered base entrance security checks and gates.
Lastly, I feel palpably more at ease in our camp dining facility after yesterday. All non-Department of Defense personnel (Arabs and Indians) now have their own entrance line at the dining facility where they are individually searched by the ubiquitous Ugandans. Even though our unit interpreters endanger their lives daily alongside the troops, have been shot by snipers, been blown up by IEDs, had their families threatened and harassed, provided first aid for wounded Soldiers, and so on, when they get on post, you simply can't trust them--even after having undergone extensive background checks, routine security screening interviews, and receiving color-coded access badges. When I saw how many pocket knives the guards had confiscated in the first day alone I was flabbergasted. Fifty of these Sri Lankan laundry workers and Jordanian interpreters were carrying concealed weapons right under our noses! That many men could have easily overpowered me and my 9mm Beretta should I have been the lone Soldier dining with dozens of suddenly fanatical contractors armed with whittling knives. Even some of the Iraqi interpreters I know had the umbrage to complain to me about the safety measures, so I set them straight. They had no gratitude for the vast improvement to their own personal safety. I personally think we could improve our situation even more by requiring all Muslims on base to sew green crescents onto their shirt sleeves. Then I could sleep just a bit sweeter at night.
Safety is our number one concern here on Camp Ramadi. Rest assured your tax money is put to good use; your family members are secure.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Ramadi in the Press, Part II
Last Sunday, my unit found itself on the front page of the Washington Post with a rollicking story about the "Battle of Donkey Island."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/18/AR2007081801270.html?hpid=topnews
(Washington Post may require you to login their site in order to view the article (it's free, but a hassle). MSN removed their link to the story).
As far as narrative goes, it's a great tale of the bravery and intrepidity of the Soldiers in my unit. They did an amazing job, and there were many stories of loyalty and courage that didn't make the cut. One of note: when Sergeant First Class Buchan was shot, one of our interpreters fought alongside the platoon and was the first to respond to his injuries and try to keep him alive. Many of our interpreters are the most loyal, valiant people in the fight. They get paid hardly anything, work away from the families much longer than even we do, are victimized by asinine suspicion-mongering "base security" policies, are directly threatened and risk their families being threatened.
Unfortunately, this inspiring war story is marred by a few sentences hinting at possible violation of the rules of engagement (war crimes) and some unhelpful, simplistic commentary at the end. It's difficult to comment on what the reporter writes in reference to killing wounded enemy combatants, especially involving my unit. I'm in the uncomfortable position of not quite being able to say it isn't true, not able to confirm the reporter likely took liberties with the story, not able to adequately explain the confusion of a violent firefight at night involving an entrenched enemy fighting to the death. I can with reasonable confidence say, barring any unfortunate revelations, that according to numerous sworn statements and a unofficial yet detailed report on the battle, that the Soldiers acquitted themselves honorably, bravely, and legally. However, maybe a few Soldiers got carried away with unsupervised, one-upping war stories to the reporter .
At the end of the article, the reporter attempts to summarize opposing viewpoints and in doing so sets up a false dichotomy. I think this is common in journalists looking to report differing perspectives; in reality they fabricate these differing opinions themselves. Here, the reporter posits that commanders are touting the battle as a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, while troops on the ground seem to think otherwise--that there was no decisive victory and that Al Qaeda is strong enough to muster a similar attack at any time, and could easily overpower the local Iraqi security force if we left. Well, both sides are obviously right, and don't really have anything to argue about. They are simply different answers to different questions juxtaposed out of context to construct opposing viewpoints. The fact remains this battle was a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, and yet, despite the Iraqi police's enthusiasm, they aren't ready to defend the city on their own. Despite our tragic loss, Al Qaeda's strategic level counter-offensive against the city that turned on them utterly failed, and sent them reeling for a while in the region. We also foiled another catastrophic attempt soon after Donkey Island involving multiple truck bombs. Since then there have been no significant offensives to retake the city, but Al Qaeda has surely learned their lesson and will likely not attempt the same methods. So yes--it was a significant victory of Al Qaeda, and yes--the burgeoning Iraqi Police and government in Ramadi need more time to become truly self-sufficient. Al Qaeda may be on their heels, but are still capable of inflicting serious set-backs. Our gains must be secured.
This link is to a recent newsbrief by Kevin Drum of CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/24/politics/animal/main3201627.shtml
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/18/AR2007081801270.html?hpid=topnews
(Washington Post may require you to login their site in order to view the article (it's free, but a hassle). MSN removed their link to the story).
As far as narrative goes, it's a great tale of the bravery and intrepidity of the Soldiers in my unit. They did an amazing job, and there were many stories of loyalty and courage that didn't make the cut. One of note: when Sergeant First Class Buchan was shot, one of our interpreters fought alongside the platoon and was the first to respond to his injuries and try to keep him alive. Many of our interpreters are the most loyal, valiant people in the fight. They get paid hardly anything, work away from the families much longer than even we do, are victimized by asinine suspicion-mongering "base security" policies, are directly threatened and risk their families being threatened.
Unfortunately, this inspiring war story is marred by a few sentences hinting at possible violation of the rules of engagement (war crimes) and some unhelpful, simplistic commentary at the end. It's difficult to comment on what the reporter writes in reference to killing wounded enemy combatants, especially involving my unit. I'm in the uncomfortable position of not quite being able to say it isn't true, not able to confirm the reporter likely took liberties with the story, not able to adequately explain the confusion of a violent firefight at night involving an entrenched enemy fighting to the death. I can with reasonable confidence say, barring any unfortunate revelations, that according to numerous sworn statements and a unofficial yet detailed report on the battle, that the Soldiers acquitted themselves honorably, bravely, and legally. However, maybe a few Soldiers got carried away with unsupervised, one-upping war stories to the reporter .
At the end of the article, the reporter attempts to summarize opposing viewpoints and in doing so sets up a false dichotomy. I think this is common in journalists looking to report differing perspectives; in reality they fabricate these differing opinions themselves. Here, the reporter posits that commanders are touting the battle as a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, while troops on the ground seem to think otherwise--that there was no decisive victory and that Al Qaeda is strong enough to muster a similar attack at any time, and could easily overpower the local Iraqi security force if we left. Well, both sides are obviously right, and don't really have anything to argue about. They are simply different answers to different questions juxtaposed out of context to construct opposing viewpoints. The fact remains this battle was a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, and yet, despite the Iraqi police's enthusiasm, they aren't ready to defend the city on their own. Despite our tragic loss, Al Qaeda's strategic level counter-offensive against the city that turned on them utterly failed, and sent them reeling for a while in the region. We also foiled another catastrophic attempt soon after Donkey Island involving multiple truck bombs. Since then there have been no significant offensives to retake the city, but Al Qaeda has surely learned their lesson and will likely not attempt the same methods. So yes--it was a significant victory of Al Qaeda, and yes--the burgeoning Iraqi Police and government in Ramadi need more time to become truly self-sufficient. Al Qaeda may be on their heels, but are still capable of inflicting serious set-backs. Our gains must be secured.
* * *
This link is to a recent newsbrief by Kevin Drum of CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/24/politics/animal/main3201627.shtml
It is a trenchant and completely accurate summary of the Al Anbar Awakening during a time when it seems military leaders are clamoring to take the credit for turning Al Anbar. Unfortunately, this concise summary of the Awakening runs amok with frivolous assertions and implications at the end. Here is the last paragraph (with commentary in italics): "The Anbar Awakening is genuinely good news, but (a) it had nothing to do with the surge (true), (b) it's happening only in homogeneous Sunni areas (mostly true, but not necessarily--the Awakening has inspired tribal leaders in mixed areas that they can indeed stand up to Al Qaeda's bloody thuggery, and some tribal leaders have Sunni and Shia in their tribe, so it is in their best interest to encourage tribal unity. There is evidence of this in Salah ad Din and Diyala already, but it remains to be seen if it will succeed as in Anbar or not), and (c) it involves arming and training Sunni forces who are almost certain to turn against both us and the Shiite central government as soon as they've finished off AQI. (Completely false, and a wild speculation. The Awakening political party (SAI)--now the most prominent in Al Anbar--is the only political party in Iraq to unabashedly support the Coalition, indeed thus far it is one of the party's foundational points. Additionally, all the Sunni Iraqi Police in Ramadi were hired and equipped by the Shia Ministry of the Interior. At least in Ramadi, nearly all IP support SAI. There are concerns that various Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad, former insurgents, will turn on us and the government after Al Qaeda is defeated, but this is a worst case scenario. Al Qaeda is the single largest destabilizing factor in Iraq--they drive the rank-and-file to the militias for protection and prevent political reconciliation from occurring. If Al Qaeda is defeated, we are on the right track. The shady Sunni groups may well be amenable to political reconciliation if Al Qaeda is neutralized. However, I'm pretty sure that if we do a complete pullout ASAP, and Iraq descends into even more lawless chaos, that the Sunni Police here will defend their land against Shia incursion, but at that point there won't really be any "central government".)
* * *
This last link is to an interesting op-ed in the New York Times written by some enlisted Soldiers in the 82nd Airborne. It doesn't involve Ramadi, but I think it is fascinating simply because of the writers--Soldiers typically do not sound so erudite, nor do they often feel compelled to make their opinions of the strategic realm known outside their chain of command. Also, it is an extremely well-articulated viewpoint of many soldiers that one does not often hear: disillusioned and confused about their mission--which is susceptible to units especially in Baghdad (see my post on surviving vs. winning about this). Their description of the quagmire of Baghdad is a visceral, boots on the ground perspective abetted with an intelligent higher level perspective. However, being in Ramadi, I simply can't support the idea that for the people of Iraq to "regain their self-respect" they will declare us an occupying force. After taking pains to develop a nuanced picture of Baghdad's complexity, that assertion is a simplistic generalization that simply doesn't apply to large swaths of the country. While I do agree with their recommendation to force the Iraqis to be increasingly self-reliant given our American need to try to do everything for them, we can't forget that this sort of mentality was previously adopted toward the Iraqi Police and resulting lack of oversight allowed many units to be infiltrated by militia elements. Mainly, the article makes me sincerely grateful to be in Ramadi.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?pagewanted=1
Saturday, August 11, 2007
Ramadi in the Press
Recently, Ramadi has received some noteworthy coverage in the press that I'd like to comment on.
The following article is from Der Spiegel, basically Germany's version of Time. It's a high profile, highly respected magazine that has been fiercely critical of the US in Iraq. Which makes the article featured here all the more noteworthy. While the section on Ramadi only takes up the first part, I think as a whole this lengthy article is probably one of the best summaries of the situation in Iraq. It pulls no punches with problems, such as the way the administration has continually self-mutilated its own credibility, ongoing sectarian violence, or the way the military (really, the Army) is stretching further to the breaking point; yet it also clearly demonstrates the tenuous, slowly growing hope that this crooked ship might somehow right itself, or at least not sink. It acknowledges the success with the failure; it shows that an immediate pullout is a fool's errand; and it also questions where this whole problem is going. The section on Ramadi features one of our company commanders in a neighborhood where in January we had two soldiers killed and a few injured. In fact we would not even drive down some of the streets because they were laden with deeply buried bombs. The same friendly folks mentioned in the article were uncommunicative and unhelpful--sullen or frightened--seven to eight months ago. The encouraging facts the article cites are straight from our Task Force records. It is a good thing to see the remarkable success here in our area juxtaposed with the mayhem in Baghdad, and the big picture perspective from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker combined with detailed, tactical views. I think it's one of the more balanced reports out there.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html
This next article was published in the Wall Street Journal, and managed to make the front page. While I think it's great that Ramadi's success has made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, from my perspective this article can be a bit misleading. I have two signifcant qualms about this article and most other positive reports from Ramadi: the amount of undue credit we like to grab for ourselves, and the simplistic cause-and-effect type analysis that limits the scope and time this turnaround has taken. Take for instance this quote: "The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders... The progress here, which has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model." The first and last sentence drive home the underlying subtext: that our campaign plan and efforts deserve the credit for this astonishing success. The 'U.S. campaign' and the 'Marine model' are off-handedly referred to as if the U.S. military were solely responsible for devising and bringing about a revolutionary strategy (involving bundles of cash) that overturned the region. It's the first assumption of the reporter and taken for granted throughout the article.
What is this "Marine model" he refers to anyway? The Marine campaign plan since we first arrived here last fall has been to prop up and defend (with the lives of Marines and Soldiers) the constitutional "legitimate" provincial government--a tiny cabal of cronies and opportunists despised by the general populace. In fact, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, our higher headquarters when we arrived, had to ditch the worthless Marine model by wooing the Sheiks and building a trust and friendship with them over the course of months (for more on this reference the USA Today article linked in my first blog entry). Additionally, the tribal leaders generally come across as a group that can be bought or easily manipulated with cold hard cash. Prominent Iraq news website IraqSlogger summarizes the article: "how the U.S. was able to court the Anbar sheikhs into turning against al Qaeda. How? Money, and lots of it." There is no denying ongoing reconstruction efforts and lucrative contracts are maintaining the current stability, but the article portrays Sheiks as greedy moochers. We've been throwing money into Al Anbar for years now with nothing to show for it except indebtedness to China. The key event that the article glosses over is when "Sheik Sattar quietly approached the U.S. about forming and alliance to fight al Qaeda. His tribe saw an alliance with U.S. forces as a means to gain power." I can't say this statement isn't true, but it fails to accurately portray what really happened, and reinforces the subtext of tribes as pliable and us as willing paymasters. The truth is that Sheik Sattar unified the local tribes on his own. Fortunately, the Army unit at the time spent the painstaking hours building trust and rapport with the Sheiks, so when they made their decision, it was easy for them to come to the Army.
I get really frustrated with our quickness to congratulate ourselves out here. It's really not so simple. The fact my unit has done so well is simply because we came in at the right time, and our task force commander had the time, patience, and concern to continue the right relationships with the tribal leaders. We could just have easily come into the pointless death grind of Ramadi just like the many units before us--which is what we would have walked into if the local tribes hadn't decided fight Al Qaeda first.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html
The following article is from Der Spiegel, basically Germany's version of Time. It's a high profile, highly respected magazine that has been fiercely critical of the US in Iraq. Which makes the article featured here all the more noteworthy. While the section on Ramadi only takes up the first part, I think as a whole this lengthy article is probably one of the best summaries of the situation in Iraq. It pulls no punches with problems, such as the way the administration has continually self-mutilated its own credibility, ongoing sectarian violence, or the way the military (really, the Army) is stretching further to the breaking point; yet it also clearly demonstrates the tenuous, slowly growing hope that this crooked ship might somehow right itself, or at least not sink. It acknowledges the success with the failure; it shows that an immediate pullout is a fool's errand; and it also questions where this whole problem is going. The section on Ramadi features one of our company commanders in a neighborhood where in January we had two soldiers killed and a few injured. In fact we would not even drive down some of the streets because they were laden with deeply buried bombs. The same friendly folks mentioned in the article were uncommunicative and unhelpful--sullen or frightened--seven to eight months ago. The encouraging facts the article cites are straight from our Task Force records. It is a good thing to see the remarkable success here in our area juxtaposed with the mayhem in Baghdad, and the big picture perspective from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker combined with detailed, tactical views. I think it's one of the more balanced reports out there.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html
This next article was published in the Wall Street Journal, and managed to make the front page. While I think it's great that Ramadi's success has made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, from my perspective this article can be a bit misleading. I have two signifcant qualms about this article and most other positive reports from Ramadi: the amount of undue credit we like to grab for ourselves, and the simplistic cause-and-effect type analysis that limits the scope and time this turnaround has taken. Take for instance this quote: "The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders... The progress here, which has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model." The first and last sentence drive home the underlying subtext: that our campaign plan and efforts deserve the credit for this astonishing success. The 'U.S. campaign' and the 'Marine model' are off-handedly referred to as if the U.S. military were solely responsible for devising and bringing about a revolutionary strategy (involving bundles of cash) that overturned the region. It's the first assumption of the reporter and taken for granted throughout the article.
What is this "Marine model" he refers to anyway? The Marine campaign plan since we first arrived here last fall has been to prop up and defend (with the lives of Marines and Soldiers) the constitutional "legitimate" provincial government--a tiny cabal of cronies and opportunists despised by the general populace. In fact, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, our higher headquarters when we arrived, had to ditch the worthless Marine model by wooing the Sheiks and building a trust and friendship with them over the course of months (for more on this reference the USA Today article linked in my first blog entry). Additionally, the tribal leaders generally come across as a group that can be bought or easily manipulated with cold hard cash. Prominent Iraq news website IraqSlogger summarizes the article: "how the U.S. was able to court the Anbar sheikhs into turning against al Qaeda. How? Money, and lots of it." There is no denying ongoing reconstruction efforts and lucrative contracts are maintaining the current stability, but the article portrays Sheiks as greedy moochers. We've been throwing money into Al Anbar for years now with nothing to show for it except indebtedness to China. The key event that the article glosses over is when "Sheik Sattar quietly approached the U.S. about forming and alliance to fight al Qaeda. His tribe saw an alliance with U.S. forces as a means to gain power." I can't say this statement isn't true, but it fails to accurately portray what really happened, and reinforces the subtext of tribes as pliable and us as willing paymasters. The truth is that Sheik Sattar unified the local tribes on his own. Fortunately, the Army unit at the time spent the painstaking hours building trust and rapport with the Sheiks, so when they made their decision, it was easy for them to come to the Army.
I get really frustrated with our quickness to congratulate ourselves out here. It's really not so simple. The fact my unit has done so well is simply because we came in at the right time, and our task force commander had the time, patience, and concern to continue the right relationships with the tribal leaders. We could just have easily come into the pointless death grind of Ramadi just like the many units before us--which is what we would have walked into if the local tribes hadn't decided fight Al Qaeda first.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html
Sunday, July 29, 2007
Iraq Wins the Asian Cup
Today I watched Iraq defeat Saudi Arabia to take their first Asian Cup victory, and achieve thus far the greatest Sport milestone in the turbulent history of Iraq. It was a thrilling match, and it was easy to see the emotional edge in the Iraqis. After a nail-biting finish, in which the Saudis missed a tying header by inches in the last five seconds, I stepped outside and warned everyone to take cover. "What for?" they asked. While I don't condone it, there is just something undeniably thrilling about the way Iraqis celebrate: weapons waving, with reams of AK-47 fire streamed into the skies! Our local IPs likely expended all of their precious training rounds we issued them this past week, but I think it was for a good cause.
I was so happy with the win. There is something unifying and galvanizing about soccer that we Americans will simply never get. Having seen last summer in the World Cup how Germany's collective national fervor swelled with each unlikely upset their plucky team pulled off, ending with the consolation prize, I was really pulling for Iraq. The Asian Cup was just something the Iraqis needed more than any other country right now--especially their first in the history of the tournament. It was sad and humorous to witness the complete apathy and ignorance of the disinterested Americans: no one really had any idea of what was going on and the utter significance of the event to this country we're so wrapped up in. There was a big announcement on the base loudspeakers 10 minutes after gunfire erupted all over Ramadi informing everyone in a purposefully calming voice it was "celebratory fire, I repeat, celebratory fire." While walking to the DFAC for dinner tonight, I did feel in passing that I was doing something a bit dangerous, a suspicion confirmed later on with the news that a Marine on camp was injured in the shoulder by a falling bullet.
http://www.afcasiancup.com/en/tournament/mtindex.asp?aid=50768&cid=1377&mt=12049&sec=105&ssec=246
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1FABE009-E442-48E8-983F-FD9017BEC162.htm
I was so happy with the win. There is something unifying and galvanizing about soccer that we Americans will simply never get. Having seen last summer in the World Cup how Germany's collective national fervor swelled with each unlikely upset their plucky team pulled off, ending with the consolation prize, I was really pulling for Iraq. The Asian Cup was just something the Iraqis needed more than any other country right now--especially their first in the history of the tournament. It was sad and humorous to witness the complete apathy and ignorance of the disinterested Americans: no one really had any idea of what was going on and the utter significance of the event to this country we're so wrapped up in. There was a big announcement on the base loudspeakers 10 minutes after gunfire erupted all over Ramadi informing everyone in a purposefully calming voice it was "celebratory fire, I repeat, celebratory fire." While walking to the DFAC for dinner tonight, I did feel in passing that I was doing something a bit dangerous, a suspicion confirmed later on with the news that a Marine on camp was injured in the shoulder by a falling bullet.
http://www.afcasiancup.com/en/tournament/mtindex.asp?aid=50768&cid=1377&mt=12049&sec=105&ssec=246
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1FABE009-E442-48E8-983F-FD9017BEC162.htm
(There is a wonderful anecdote about a very similar circumstance in the book The Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a fascinating account of the CPA in the Green Zone. I realized the connection after I wrote this, so maybe I was influenced by that. I don't know.)
Friday, July 20, 2007
Monument
“It was evident to him that the world composed and recomposed itself constantly in an endless process of dissatisfaction.” E.L. Doctorow, Ragtime
This past week, the powers that be on Camp Ramadi destroyed my favorite landmark. One day it was there, and the next large earth-movers were swarming over it bulldozing it apart and trucking it off. I was upset not so much that it was going away, but that I had not taken the time to properly document it. It was situated alongside a prominent footpath from the dining facility to our unit headquarters compound, and so was a source of daily joy to me for many months of the deployment. Its existence was at once improbable yet perfectly explainable, fantastic yet almost vulgar; it carried a depth of irony that was fresh and enjoyable: maintaining a lofty artistic stature in a low-brow location, and its general trashy untidiness held a rebellious, cocksure stance amid the dull efficiencies and proprieties of a military garrison. Nothing that cool, interesting, or ugly could long exist in proximity to a military compound.
The monument was a large dune of sand, rocks, trash, and dust--nearly six feet, with an enormous ball of barbed wire, concrete chunks, Hesco bastion remnants, torn sand bags, and all other manner of construction waste, junk, and detritus perched almost delicately atop it, towering fully over fourteen feet in height. Mangled metal rebar frizzled out of it like the extravagant blown-glass tentacles of Dale Chihuly; snagged plastic bags rattled in the wind like tawdry Tibetan prayer flags; a few tumbleweeds clung like briars: it was a masterpiece of aleatoric sculpture. A bastard hybrid of highbrow earthworks art and the rapid expediency of a constantly changing combat environment. I noticed a number of platoons taking their group photos in front of it before leaving, so I think it did elicit some popular appeal; it certainly was unavoidable, definitely not obscure. As time dragged on, my thoughts on the sculpture moved from a novelty interest to believe that it could symbolize the operation of Camp Ramadi as whole, and the impersonal nature of institutional change and form. It was a testament to the vagaries of military command policy just as an icicle sculpture by Andy Goldsworthy or sand drawing by Jim Denevan bears witness to the transient whims of Nature.
It goes something like this: a new unit rolls in, hard-charging: they conduct the battle hand-over and by golly they've got to change things. That previous unit got complacent in their last months, and we're going to improve their lazy position--we're not like them! Changing mission requirements, troop surges, reductions, and movements; expanding housing, remodeling facilities, destroying housing, changing units, and so on: the landmark became a repository of all the castaway jetsam of a myriad of plans and lack thereof, calculated "position improvements" and camp restructurings, and so on. At face value the chance sculpture was a pile of trash expediently, randomly formed into an interesting shape, but to me it was a monument to all the myriad rearrangings of Camp Ramadi and the fickle decisions that govern it. I suppose all of this is merely the normal progression of things, and perhaps specious to connect natural change to a perceived hubris in command, but the fact remains that someone finally deemed it necessary to allocate resources to rid the camp of the impertinent eyesore, when it didn't really seem to impede the "progress" or "development" of the camp. My new favorite landmark is not quite so compelling, but a bit more stark: it is the pristine concrete sidewalk constructed at great expense two months ago in front of the Post Exchange; two weeks ago it was barricaded by chain-link fencing in a rash of force protection upgrades.
This past week, the powers that be on Camp Ramadi destroyed my favorite landmark. One day it was there, and the next large earth-movers were swarming over it bulldozing it apart and trucking it off. I was upset not so much that it was going away, but that I had not taken the time to properly document it. It was situated alongside a prominent footpath from the dining facility to our unit headquarters compound, and so was a source of daily joy to me for many months of the deployment. Its existence was at once improbable yet perfectly explainable, fantastic yet almost vulgar; it carried a depth of irony that was fresh and enjoyable: maintaining a lofty artistic stature in a low-brow location, and its general trashy untidiness held a rebellious, cocksure stance amid the dull efficiencies and proprieties of a military garrison. Nothing that cool, interesting, or ugly could long exist in proximity to a military compound.
The monument was a large dune of sand, rocks, trash, and dust--nearly six feet, with an enormous ball of barbed wire, concrete chunks, Hesco bastion remnants, torn sand bags, and all other manner of construction waste, junk, and detritus perched almost delicately atop it, towering fully over fourteen feet in height. Mangled metal rebar frizzled out of it like the extravagant blown-glass tentacles of Dale Chihuly; snagged plastic bags rattled in the wind like tawdry Tibetan prayer flags; a few tumbleweeds clung like briars: it was a masterpiece of aleatoric sculpture. A bastard hybrid of highbrow earthworks art and the rapid expediency of a constantly changing combat environment. I noticed a number of platoons taking their group photos in front of it before leaving, so I think it did elicit some popular appeal; it certainly was unavoidable, definitely not obscure. As time dragged on, my thoughts on the sculpture moved from a novelty interest to believe that it could symbolize the operation of Camp Ramadi as whole, and the impersonal nature of institutional change and form. It was a testament to the vagaries of military command policy just as an icicle sculpture by Andy Goldsworthy or sand drawing by Jim Denevan bears witness to the transient whims of Nature.
It goes something like this: a new unit rolls in, hard-charging: they conduct the battle hand-over and by golly they've got to change things. That previous unit got complacent in their last months, and we're going to improve their lazy position--we're not like them! Changing mission requirements, troop surges, reductions, and movements; expanding housing, remodeling facilities, destroying housing, changing units, and so on: the landmark became a repository of all the castaway jetsam of a myriad of plans and lack thereof, calculated "position improvements" and camp restructurings, and so on. At face value the chance sculpture was a pile of trash expediently, randomly formed into an interesting shape, but to me it was a monument to all the myriad rearrangings of Camp Ramadi and the fickle decisions that govern it. I suppose all of this is merely the normal progression of things, and perhaps specious to connect natural change to a perceived hubris in command, but the fact remains that someone finally deemed it necessary to allocate resources to rid the camp of the impertinent eyesore, when it didn't really seem to impede the "progress" or "development" of the camp. My new favorite landmark is not quite so compelling, but a bit more stark: it is the pristine concrete sidewalk constructed at great expense two months ago in front of the Post Exchange; two weeks ago it was barricaded by chain-link fencing in a rash of force protection upgrades.
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Generals
The following link is to an article titled "A failure in generalship". The article is superb. Moreover, it articulates a general view held by myself and many of my peers in a serious, scholarly, well-thought way, with sound recommendations for improvement; whereas we typically resort first to satire, then frustration and resignation. Then back to satire. I'm sure this article is much more productive than our lunchtime caricatures.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198
I also believe strongly that the current overall commander in Iraq, General Petraeus, is an exception to the officers described in the article. Tragically, he may have taken charge too late, but I have hope for this war with him at the helm. Also tragically, they moved up his predecessor to Chief of Staff of the Army.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198
I also believe strongly that the current overall commander in Iraq, General Petraeus, is an exception to the officers described in the article. Tragically, he may have taken charge too late, but I have hope for this war with him at the helm. Also tragically, they moved up his predecessor to Chief of Staff of the Army.
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