Ramadi in the Press

Recently, Ramadi has received some noteworthy coverage in the press that I'd like to comment on.

The following article is from Der Spiegel, basically Germany's version of Time. It's a high profile, highly respected magazine that has been fiercely critical of the US in Iraq. Which makes the article featured here all the more noteworthy. While the section on Ramadi only takes up the first part, I think as a whole this lengthy article is probably one of the best summaries of the situation in Iraq. It pulls no punches with problems, such as the way the administration has continually self-mutilated its own credibility, ongoing sectarian violence, or the way the military (really, the Army) is stretching further to the breaking point; yet it also clearly demonstrates the tenuous, slowly growing hope that this crooked ship might somehow right itself, or at least not sink. It acknowledges the success with the failure; it shows that an immediate pullout is a fool's errand; and it also questions where this whole problem is going. The section on Ramadi features one of our company commanders in a neighborhood where in January we had two soldiers killed and a few injured. In fact we would not even drive down some of the streets because they were laden with deeply buried bombs. The same friendly folks mentioned in the article were uncommunicative and unhelpful--sullen or frightened--seven to eight months ago. The encouraging facts the article cites are straight from our Task Force records. It is a good thing to see the remarkable success here in our area juxtaposed with the mayhem in Baghdad, and the big picture perspective from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker combined with detailed, tactical views. I think it's one of the more balanced reports out there.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html




This next article was published in the Wall Street Journal, and managed to make the front page. While I think it's great that Ramadi's success has made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, from my perspective this article can be a bit misleading. I have two signifcant qualms about this article and most other positive reports from Ramadi: the amount of undue credit we like to grab for ourselves, and the simplistic cause-and-effect type analysis that limits the scope and time this turnaround has taken. Take for instance this quote: "The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders... The progress here, which has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model." The first and last sentence drive home the underlying subtext: that our campaign plan and efforts deserve the credit for this astonishing success. The 'U.S. campaign' and the 'Marine model' are off-handedly referred to as if the U.S. military were solely responsible for devising and bringing about a revolutionary strategy (involving bundles of cash) that overturned the region. It's the first assumption of the reporter and taken for granted throughout the article.

What is this "Marine model" he refers to anyway? The Marine campaign plan since we first arrived here last fall has been to prop up and defend (with the lives of Marines and Soldiers) the constitutional "legitimate" provincial government--a tiny cabal of cronies and opportunists despised by the general populace. In fact, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, our higher headquarters when we arrived, had to ditch the worthless Marine model by wooing the Sheiks and building a trust and friendship with them over the course of months (for more on this reference the USA Today article linked in my first blog entry). Additionally, the tribal leaders generally come across as a group that can be bought or easily manipulated with cold hard cash. Prominent Iraq news website IraqSlogger summarizes the article: "how the U.S. was able to court the Anbar sheikhs into turning against al Qaeda. How? Money, and lots of it." There is no denying ongoing reconstruction efforts and lucrative contracts are maintaining the current stability, but the article portrays Sheiks as greedy moochers. We've been throwing money into Al Anbar for years now with nothing to show for it except indebtedness to China. The key event that the article glosses over is when "Sheik Sattar quietly approached the U.S. about forming and alliance to fight al Qaeda. His tribe saw an alliance with U.S. forces as a means to gain power." I can't say this statement isn't true, but it fails to accurately portray what really happened, and reinforces the subtext of tribes as pliable and us as willing paymasters. The truth is that Sheik Sattar unified the local tribes on his own. Fortunately, the Army unit at the time spent the painstaking hours building trust and rapport with the Sheiks, so when they made their decision, it was easy for them to come to the Army.

I get really frustrated with our quickness to congratulate ourselves out here. It's really not so simple. The fact my unit has done so well is simply because we came in at the right time, and our task force commander had the time, patience, and concern to continue the right relationships with the tribal leaders. We could just have easily come into the pointless death grind of Ramadi just like the many units before us--which is what we would have walked into if the local tribes hadn't decided fight Al Qaeda first.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html