Scoring the Counterinsurgency

This post features commentary on the following editorial:
http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=267664846901795

This editorial rehashes one of the basic premises of a counterinsurgency: tactical success does not equal strategic victory. But if the cynical, manipulative liberal media reported "the truth" (i.e. our ongoing tactical success) and did their part to support the troops, then we could sustain the political will to win the war.

I disagree with the editorial's wholehearted blame of the media. While there are many in the media who use their position to push an agenda, they also respond to demand. They have a readership and they know their market; they know what sells and what people want to read. The American public is interested in American lives affected by the war, for good or for ill, and that's why you see a preponderance of reporting on American tragedies. The administration and military leaders are equally at fault for bungling public expectations and feelings for the war. In one sense, an insurgency is a long-term siege of a nation's political will. When President Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in May of 2003 to declare "Mission Accomplished" to the nation and world, he opened wide a gate for the besieging terrorists. Our wall of credibility sustained a lot of damage. Manipulating patriotism to gain support by sugar-coating, euphemizing, or ignoring what's really going on will eventually backfire, because people do not like being made fools of themselves--it's simple disrespect. For example, not allowing generals to use the word "insurgency" to describe the increasing violence back in 2003 only provoked skepticism and cynicism later on. Anthony Cordesman, a military scholar says this: "...there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn't a matter of a cynical media or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. By the time we finish "spinning," we deprive ourselves of credibility, domestically and internationally." I think what you see in the media is part backlash against this loss of credibility. A classic recent example of this: Senator McCain's publicity stunt two months ago in a Baghdad market. Once the front-runner in the Republican party, since that incident McCain's ratings have dropped.

The other problem with the editorial is their complete reliance on metrics. Keeping score is an over-simplification of the fight. Our task is not to kill more terrorists than they kill Soldiers--there will always be more terrorists. Our job is to protect the people, foster capable and legitimate local security forces to augment and eventually replace undermanned US positions, mentor the legitimate local government to provide rule of law and essential services, and help the local Iraqi government and security forces win popular support to forge a populace resistant to insurgents. At the strategic level, we must help reconcile sectarian rivalry that has stymied government efficacy and wilted public perception and establish government institutions to make things work. Time and time again I've seen bureaucratic bean counters lose the forest for the trees over metrics, stats, and yellow gumballs on PowerPoint slides. I'm not advocating doing away with all metrics, because they are useful and play a role, just consider them in context. In its rush to blame, this editorial fails to keep the big picture in perspective. A great example of this is how the editorial uses numbers to expose the lie that life was better under Saddam. I'm here to say that life was a lot better for Iraqis under Saddam. I know because they tell us this all the time. The fact is those stats are meaningless to your average Iraqi who's dealing with 120 degree heat with no A/C, and thinks that the Shia government has abandoned him, or Sunni car bombs are disrupting his electricity--who is on the fence toward supporting the local police or the local insurgent. My point is that in order to win we're dealing with a precarious, subjective balance of human perception and popular will, which is extremely difficult to quantify. Killing hundreds of terrorists in Al Anbar didn't get us anywhere until we managed to gain the popular support of the local tribes, who brought security to the people, whose actions proved to the people that they offered a better future than dismal uncertainty of random violence. Our success in Ramadi had nothing to do with a body count. "Keeping score" loses sight of what we really need to accomplish, and won't necessarily get us any closer to that objective.