Headed Home

Early this morning (November 17th, 2007), I finally landed in Kuwait. After a few days or so of personnel out-processing, I'll be on my way back to Germany after spending the last fifteen months and two weeks in the Middle East. Fifteen months is too long of a time away from those you love. What makes it especially difficult is the Army's steadfast dedication to stripping away any semblance of predictability or give straight answers regarding our timeline throughout the deployment. To summarize: we deployed in August; we were supposed to come home in June 2007, then August 2007, then early October 2007, then late October 2007, and now, finally November 2007. I'd very much like to give the military the benefit of the doubt on this front: I know there are all kinds of exceedingly complicated decisions and a multitude of variables and contingencies involved with the herculean task of managing troop levels and movements. But on the other hand, senior leaders in the Army just do not seem to understand that the only thing a Soldier's spouse or mom wants to hear is when are they coming home. Families know they can't expect an exact date, but continually deferring hopes on this point over the course of fifteen months simply frustrates and demoralizes them. Furthermore, in the case of my Task Force in Ramadi, we were complete with all combat operations by 11 October. Why are we just now flying home a month and a half later? Once again, I'd like to give the Army the benefit of the doubt, but without a single adequate attempt at a justification or rationale for this five week delay by the chain of command, Soldiers and junior leaders are left to stew in their own cynical conclusions or assumptions.

At about fourteen months (mid-September), the constant drag of the deployment caught up to me--like running away from a fixed point attached to a giant elastic band. We were simultaneously handing over our area of operations in western Ramadi to a Marine battalion while preparing for a large-scale clearance operation far to Ramadi's north partnered with the Iraqi Army. Our mission was to support their clearance of a lawless expanse of land along the eastern shore of the Thar Thar Reservoir (the large body of water right in the middle of Iraq). The key aspect of the mission was to complete the initial force protection of a combat outpost for the Iraqi Army so they could maintain a permanent presence in the area, partnered with another US Army unit. The mission was a great success: we (with Iraqi Army in the lead) found numerous caches and IEDs, and detained a few insurgents. The particular area has been one of Al Qaeda's strategic bastions for the past few years: situated along a key route between Salah ad Din and Al Anbar provinces (the main road runs from Fallujah to Samarra), and close enough to provide a base of support to Baghdad. The new operating base will fully disrupt insurgent operations in this key area, and greatly contribute to the security of Fallujah, Ramadi, and hopefully Baghdad; it will also cut down on the notorious hijacking of civilian Iraqis that has occurred in that region for a long time. Best of all, no one from our battalion was seriously hurt or killed.

Suffice to say, this was our largest operation of the deployment. Preparations were detailed and stressful, with about a week of living on edge in the desert. It was a deep moment of relief to return safe and successful to Camp Ramadi. And then I was done. The tension of fourteen months reached its limit, and without the propulsion of external action, ennui set in. So I spent the past five weeks stretching five days worth of redeployment work activity into a month, haphazardly studying for the GRE, loafing, and booking a sweet second honeymoon to Barcelona with Robin that I now have to cancel because the Air Force couldn't manage to bring me home on schedule (but really it's my fault). I also did not care to update my blog for those few who manage to read it. I'm sorry to those of you who were wondering what was going on and hoping for an update. I tentatively plan on periodically commenting on various aspects of the War from my perspective, and if any of you have something particular you are wondering about, feel free to post here or email me at david.h.bradley@us.army.mil. It's been a long war for Robin and I, and I'm ready to spend some time at home.

Solar-Powered Street Lights

It is official. The US Army brigade in Ramadi has now spent $1.94 million on solar-powered street lights. Or, more accurately, the Army has spent $1.94 million attempting to light up Ramadi with solar-powered street lights.


The saga of the solar-powered street lights began late this Spring when the provincial government featured a modest project for new street lights in the downtown area of the war damaged city. The solar-powered lights were to be an interim solution until the Ramadi director general (DG) of municipalities was able to repair or replace the preexisting street lights in the city as electricity service improved to the region. The military pounced on this brilliant plan, aiming to exploit it throughout the city. Starting as murmur, soon echoes of "Solar lights, solar lights, solar lights?? Solar Lights!" reverberated through the shabby concrete halls and into makeshift wooden cubicles, wafted over the radios, and permeated emails, spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slides. Somehow the very future of the city rested in the flourishing of solar-powered street lights. Maybe Iraqis too can learn to have the moral self-satisfaction of having Green public works initiatives. Within a month, Iraqi municipal workers, contractors, and engineers were bustling around the city developing pricey scopes of work and contracts for the ravenous military demand for more solar-powered street lights.


The first completed run of solar-powered street lights amounted to nothing more than a glowstick atop a shoddy fifteen foot pole. Another strip of sixty had only ten functional lights. The Iraqi DGs (director generals--municipal officials) wonder about our zealous adoption of a temporary solution, when already the electricity service is improving to the point when the existing infrastructure should be repaired. But we are paying out--solar lights are lucrative. It's a wonder the municipal employees don't quit working for the city to come build solar lights for the US Army. It was a point of personal pride in our unit that we had successfully stymied any installation of solar-powered street lights in our area of operations during our tenure.


UPDATE: I thought I had escaped the solar-powered street lights once and for all after leaving Ramadi. Not so. Camp Virginia, Kuwait has scores of gorgeous solar-powered streetlights (about eight feet apart, too). Being so closely spaced, they make superb road markers; illumination, however, comes from the noisy, gas-powered generator light systems placed along each row of solar-powered street lights.

Sheik Sittar Albu Resha Assassinated

It was to be my pleasure to write today of two remarkable events: the city of Ramadi's 5k Run: a triumphant competition held in the heart of the city, with over 200 enthusiastic Iraqi participants--a stunning return to somewhat normal life; and also of a sizable delegation of Shiite tribal leaders from the South who just a few days ago sojourned to Ramadi to praise and thank the leaders of the Sunni Anbar Awakening for inspiring their own tribal awakening movement, and to express unity and solidarity in the face of the debilitating sectarianism that has riven Iraq. Tragically, these heartening events have been entirely overshadowed by the treacherous assassination of Sheik Sittar Bezea Ftykhan Albu Resha, charismatic figurehead and galvanizing force behind the Al Anbar Awakening, leader of Iraq's quickly growing political party advocating unity and reconciliation, and source of great hope to any Iraqi aspiring to defy Al Qaeda's insidious grip on the nation.

Will Sheik Sittar become a martyr and shock the people into an even deeper and more earnest effort to rid the region of Al Qaeda, or will it frighten those working for the good and foreshadow the return of Al Qaeda's mystique of fear and control? As for Ramadi, and perhaps Al Anbar, I believe the former case will hold true. Yet I can't help but realize, painfully, that the glimmer of hope Sheik Sittar and his awakening brought to the possibility of national reconciliation has been dimmed. Speaking selfishly, I only wish the perpetrators had procrastinated until our departure, allowing us time to emotionally divest ourselves before succeeding with the single greatest act that could ruin all the impossible gains we have experienced first hand in our year in Ramadi.

Cognitive Dissonance

Military strategist Max Boot has a lucid and sobering article in Commentary Magazine about the possibilities for our continued involvement in Iraq:

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10920&page=all

I personally fully agree with his conclusions from a strategic perspective, and the optimist in me along with what I've experienced first-hand in Ramadi believes it is our best shot and also even possible. It seems to me Mr Boot charts the best course of any commentator thus far, even if he does so by drawing out the wretched alternatives to the surge and the current strategy. However, from my perspective, I'm not so sure he has adequately addressed the strain on the military--especially the Army. From what I've seen, most junior officers are already getting out. Fifteen month deployments are difficult to bear for equipment and personnel, especially in a counterinsurgency where tangible results are nearly impossible to quantify, and a tactical success may not guarantee your buddy won't die in a suicide vest attack the next day. For any soldier you might find who wants to stay and "finish the job," you'll find another simply trying to figure out what that job is he is trying to finish, or another who is just trying to survive another day.

I confess I have cognitive dissonance about the war. Though I think we must stay the course and finish what we started, I surely don't want that person finishing the job to be me if I can help it.

Safety is Our #1 Concern

Everyone on Camp Ramadi is feeling a lot more safe today. A number of initiatives have been established recently that have noticeably improved base security. The base management unit has been setting up checkpoints around Camp Ramadi to make sure people are wearing their seat belts and not speeding--and also making sure people are wearing their flak vest and Kevlar helmets while driving in humvees from their barracks to the Post Exchange or laundry point on the camp. A lot of Soldiers and Marines hadn't been doing that, but this initiative will truly ensure that those accidents that never happened previously won't occur in the future either. One unit was stopped for speeding while taking a casualty to the medical clinic; they hopefully learned the error of their ways. Their carelessness could have easily made a bad situation much worse.

Family and friends back home can rest assured knowing their loved ones are safer than ever thanks to the scrupulous tax dollar investments toward force protection upgrades made in the past month. Hundreds of thick concrete barriers now line the roads around post to keep the humvees from veering off into the thick dust. Dust clouds can reduce visibility in an instant and make you cough. A few of these countless barriers also protect a couple vital structures from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. Although impossible, it can be conceived that one of these vehicles and drivers could pass completely undetected through the triple tiered base entrance security checks and gates.

Lastly, I feel palpably more at ease in our camp dining facility after yesterday. All non-Department of Defense personnel (Arabs and Indians) now have their own entrance line at the dining facility where they are individually searched by the ubiquitous Ugandans. Even though our unit interpreters endanger their lives daily alongside the troops, have been shot by snipers, been blown up by IEDs, had their families threatened and harassed, provided first aid for wounded Soldiers, and so on, when they get on post, you simply can't trust them--even after having undergone extensive background checks, routine security screening interviews, and receiving color-coded access badges. When I saw how many pocket knives the guards had confiscated in the first day alone I was flabbergasted. Fifty of these Sri Lankan laundry workers and Jordanian interpreters were carrying concealed weapons right under our noses! That many men could have easily overpowered me and my 9mm Beretta should I have been the lone Soldier dining with dozens of suddenly fanatical contractors armed with whittling knives. Even some of the Iraqi interpreters I know had the umbrage to complain to me about the safety measures, so I set them straight. They had no gratitude for the vast improvement to their own personal safety. I personally think we could improve our situation even more by requiring all Muslims on base to sew green crescents onto their shirt sleeves. Then I could sleep just a bit sweeter at night.

Safety is our number one concern here on Camp Ramadi. Rest assured your tax money is put to good use; your family members are secure.

Ramadi in the Press, Part II

Last Sunday, my unit found itself on the front page of the Washington Post with a rollicking story about the "Battle of Donkey Island."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/18/AR2007081801270.html?hpid=topnews
(Washington Post may require you to login their site in order to view the article (it's free, but a hassle). MSN removed their link to the story).

As far as narrative goes, it's a great tale of the bravery and intrepidity of the Soldiers in my unit. They did an amazing job, and there were many stories of loyalty and courage that didn't make the cut. One of note: when Sergeant First Class Buchan was shot, one of our interpreters fought alongside the platoon and was the first to respond to his injuries and try to keep him alive. Many of our interpreters are the most loyal, valiant people in the fight. They get paid hardly anything, work away from the families much longer than even we do, are victimized by asinine suspicion-mongering "base security" policies, are directly threatened and risk their families being threatened.

Unfortunately, this inspiring war story is marred by a few sentences hinting at possible violation of the rules of engagement (war crimes) and some unhelpful, simplistic commentary at the end. It's difficult to comment on what the reporter writes in reference to killing wounded enemy combatants, especially involving my unit. I'm in the uncomfortable position of not quite being able to say it isn't true, not able to confirm the reporter likely took liberties with the story, not able to adequately explain the confusion of a violent firefight at night involving an entrenched enemy fighting to the death. I can with reasonable confidence say, barring any unfortunate revelations, that according to numerous sworn statements and a unofficial yet detailed report on the battle, that the Soldiers acquitted themselves honorably, bravely, and legally. However, maybe a few Soldiers got carried away with unsupervised, one-upping war stories to the reporter .

At the end of the article, the reporter attempts to summarize opposing viewpoints and in doing so sets up a false dichotomy. I think this is common in journalists looking to report differing perspectives; in reality they fabricate these differing opinions themselves. Here, the reporter posits that commanders are touting the battle as a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, while troops on the ground seem to think otherwise--that there was no decisive victory and that Al Qaeda is strong enough to muster a similar attack at any time, and could easily overpower the local Iraqi security force if we left. Well, both sides are obviously right, and don't really have anything to argue about. They are simply different answers to different questions juxtaposed out of context to construct opposing viewpoints. The fact remains this battle was a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, and yet, despite the Iraqi police's enthusiasm, they aren't ready to defend the city on their own. Despite our tragic loss, Al Qaeda's strategic level counter-offensive against the city that turned on them utterly failed, and sent them reeling for a while in the region. We also foiled another catastrophic attempt soon after Donkey Island involving multiple truck bombs. Since then there have been no significant offensives to retake the city, but Al Qaeda has surely learned their lesson and will likely not attempt the same methods. So yes--it was a significant victory of Al Qaeda, and yes--the burgeoning Iraqi Police and government in Ramadi need more time to become truly self-sufficient. Al Qaeda may be on their heels, but are still capable of inflicting serious set-backs. Our gains must be secured.

* * *

This link is to a recent newsbrief by Kevin Drum of CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/24/politics/animal/main3201627.shtml

It is a trenchant and completely accurate summary of the Al Anbar Awakening during a time when it seems military leaders are clamoring to take the credit for turning Al Anbar. Unfortunately, this concise summary of the Awakening runs amok with frivolous assertions and implications at the end. Here is the last paragraph (with commentary in italics): "The Anbar Awakening is genuinely good news, but (a) it had nothing to do with the surge (true), (b) it's happening only in homogeneous Sunni areas (mostly true, but not necessarily--the Awakening has inspired tribal leaders in mixed areas that they can indeed stand up to Al Qaeda's bloody thuggery, and some tribal leaders have Sunni and Shia in their tribe, so it is in their best interest to encourage tribal unity. There is evidence of this in Salah ad Din and Diyala already, but it remains to be seen if it will succeed as in Anbar or not), and (c) it involves arming and training Sunni forces who are almost certain to turn against both us and the Shiite central government as soon as they've finished off AQI. (Completely false, and a wild speculation. The Awakening political party (SAI)--now the most prominent in Al Anbar--is the only political party in Iraq to unabashedly support the Coalition, indeed thus far it is one of the party's foundational points. Additionally, all the Sunni Iraqi Police in Ramadi were hired and equipped by the Shia Ministry of the Interior. At least in Ramadi, nearly all IP support SAI. There are concerns that various Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad, former insurgents, will turn on us and the government after Al Qaeda is defeated, but this is a worst case scenario. Al Qaeda is the single largest destabilizing factor in Iraq--they drive the rank-and-file to the militias for protection and prevent political reconciliation from occurring. If Al Qaeda is defeated, we are on the right track. The shady Sunni groups may well be amenable to political reconciliation if Al Qaeda is neutralized. However, I'm pretty sure that if we do a complete pullout ASAP, and Iraq descends into even more lawless chaos, that the Sunni Police here will defend their land against Shia incursion, but at that point there won't really be any "central government".)

* * *

This last link is to an interesting op-ed in the New York Times written by some enlisted Soldiers in the 82nd Airborne. It doesn't involve Ramadi, but I think it is fascinating simply because of the writers--Soldiers typically do not sound so erudite, nor do they often feel compelled to make their opinions of the strategic realm known outside their chain of command. Also, it is an extremely well-articulated viewpoint of many soldiers that one does not often hear: disillusioned and confused about their mission--which is susceptible to units especially in Baghdad (see my post on surviving vs. winning about this). Their description of the quagmire of Baghdad is a visceral, boots on the ground perspective abetted with an intelligent higher level perspective. However, being in Ramadi, I simply can't support the idea that for the people of Iraq to "regain their self-respect" they will declare us an occupying force. After taking pains to develop a nuanced picture of Baghdad's complexity, that assertion is a simplistic generalization that simply doesn't apply to large swaths of the country. While I do agree with their recommendation to force the Iraqis to be increasingly self-reliant given our American need to try to do everything for them, we can't forget that this sort of mentality was previously adopted toward the Iraqi Police and resulting lack of oversight allowed many units to be infiltrated by militia elements. Mainly, the article makes me sincerely grateful to be in Ramadi.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?pagewanted=1

Ramadi in the Press

Recently, Ramadi has received some noteworthy coverage in the press that I'd like to comment on.

The following article is from Der Spiegel, basically Germany's version of Time. It's a high profile, highly respected magazine that has been fiercely critical of the US in Iraq. Which makes the article featured here all the more noteworthy. While the section on Ramadi only takes up the first part, I think as a whole this lengthy article is probably one of the best summaries of the situation in Iraq. It pulls no punches with problems, such as the way the administration has continually self-mutilated its own credibility, ongoing sectarian violence, or the way the military (really, the Army) is stretching further to the breaking point; yet it also clearly demonstrates the tenuous, slowly growing hope that this crooked ship might somehow right itself, or at least not sink. It acknowledges the success with the failure; it shows that an immediate pullout is a fool's errand; and it also questions where this whole problem is going. The section on Ramadi features one of our company commanders in a neighborhood where in January we had two soldiers killed and a few injured. In fact we would not even drive down some of the streets because they were laden with deeply buried bombs. The same friendly folks mentioned in the article were uncommunicative and unhelpful--sullen or frightened--seven to eight months ago. The encouraging facts the article cites are straight from our Task Force records. It is a good thing to see the remarkable success here in our area juxtaposed with the mayhem in Baghdad, and the big picture perspective from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker combined with detailed, tactical views. I think it's one of the more balanced reports out there.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html




This next article was published in the Wall Street Journal, and managed to make the front page. While I think it's great that Ramadi's success has made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, from my perspective this article can be a bit misleading. I have two signifcant qualms about this article and most other positive reports from Ramadi: the amount of undue credit we like to grab for ourselves, and the simplistic cause-and-effect type analysis that limits the scope and time this turnaround has taken. Take for instance this quote: "The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders... The progress here, which has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model." The first and last sentence drive home the underlying subtext: that our campaign plan and efforts deserve the credit for this astonishing success. The 'U.S. campaign' and the 'Marine model' are off-handedly referred to as if the U.S. military were solely responsible for devising and bringing about a revolutionary strategy (involving bundles of cash) that overturned the region. It's the first assumption of the reporter and taken for granted throughout the article.

What is this "Marine model" he refers to anyway? The Marine campaign plan since we first arrived here last fall has been to prop up and defend (with the lives of Marines and Soldiers) the constitutional "legitimate" provincial government--a tiny cabal of cronies and opportunists despised by the general populace. In fact, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, our higher headquarters when we arrived, had to ditch the worthless Marine model by wooing the Sheiks and building a trust and friendship with them over the course of months (for more on this reference the USA Today article linked in my first blog entry). Additionally, the tribal leaders generally come across as a group that can be bought or easily manipulated with cold hard cash. Prominent Iraq news website IraqSlogger summarizes the article: "how the U.S. was able to court the Anbar sheikhs into turning against al Qaeda. How? Money, and lots of it." There is no denying ongoing reconstruction efforts and lucrative contracts are maintaining the current stability, but the article portrays Sheiks as greedy moochers. We've been throwing money into Al Anbar for years now with nothing to show for it except indebtedness to China. The key event that the article glosses over is when "Sheik Sattar quietly approached the U.S. about forming and alliance to fight al Qaeda. His tribe saw an alliance with U.S. forces as a means to gain power." I can't say this statement isn't true, but it fails to accurately portray what really happened, and reinforces the subtext of tribes as pliable and us as willing paymasters. The truth is that Sheik Sattar unified the local tribes on his own. Fortunately, the Army unit at the time spent the painstaking hours building trust and rapport with the Sheiks, so when they made their decision, it was easy for them to come to the Army.

I get really frustrated with our quickness to congratulate ourselves out here. It's really not so simple. The fact my unit has done so well is simply because we came in at the right time, and our task force commander had the time, patience, and concern to continue the right relationships with the tribal leaders. We could just have easily come into the pointless death grind of Ramadi just like the many units before us--which is what we would have walked into if the local tribes hadn't decided fight Al Qaeda first.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html

Iraq Wins the Asian Cup

Today I watched Iraq defeat Saudi Arabia to take their first Asian Cup victory, and achieve thus far the greatest Sport milestone in the turbulent history of Iraq. It was a thrilling match, and it was easy to see the emotional edge in the Iraqis. After a nail-biting finish, in which the Saudis missed a tying header by inches in the last five seconds, I stepped outside and warned everyone to take cover. "What for?" they asked. While I don't condone it, there is just something undeniably thrilling about the way Iraqis celebrate: weapons waving, with reams of AK-47 fire streamed into the skies! Our local IPs likely expended all of their precious training rounds we issued them this past week, but I think it was for a good cause.

I was so happy with the win. There is something unifying and galvanizing about soccer that we Americans will simply never get. Having seen last summer in the World Cup how Germany's collective national fervor swelled with each unlikely upset their plucky team pulled off, ending with the consolation prize, I was really pulling for Iraq. The Asian Cup was just something the Iraqis needed more than any other country right now--especially their first in the history of the tournament. It was sad and humorous to witness the complete apathy and ignorance of the disinterested Americans: no one really had any idea of what was going on and the utter significance of the event to this country we're so wrapped up in. There was a big announcement on the base loudspeakers 10 minutes after gunfire erupted all over Ramadi informing everyone in a purposefully calming voice it was "celebratory fire, I repeat, celebratory fire." While walking to the DFAC for dinner tonight, I did feel in passing that I was doing something a bit dangerous, a suspicion confirmed later on with the news that a Marine on camp was injured in the shoulder by a falling bullet.

http://www.afcasiancup.com/en/tournament/mtindex.asp?aid=50768&cid=1377&mt=12049&sec=105&ssec=246

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1FABE009-E442-48E8-983F-FD9017BEC162.htm

(There is a wonderful anecdote about a very similar circumstance in the book The Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a fascinating account of the CPA in the Green Zone. I realized the connection after I wrote this, so maybe I was influenced by that. I don't know.)

Monument

“It was evident to him that the world composed and recomposed itself constantly in an endless process of dissatisfaction.” E.L. Doctorow, Ragtime


This past week, the powers that be on Camp Ramadi destroyed my favorite landmark. One day it was there, and the next large earth-movers were swarming over it bulldozing it apart and trucking it off. I was upset not so much that it was going away, but that I had not taken the time to properly document it. It was situated alongside a prominent footpath from the dining facility to our unit headquarters compound, and so was a source of daily joy to me for many months of the deployment. Its existence was at once improbable yet perfectly explainable, fantastic yet almost vulgar; it carried a depth of irony that was fresh and enjoyable: maintaining a lofty artistic stature in a low-brow location, and its general trashy untidiness held a rebellious, cocksure stance amid the dull efficiencies and proprieties of a military garrison. Nothing that cool, interesting, or ugly could long exist in proximity to a military compound.

The monument was a large dune of sand, rocks, trash, and dust--nearly six feet, with an enormous ball of barbed wire, concrete chunks, Hesco bastion remnants, torn sand bags, and all other manner of construction waste, junk, and detritus perched almost delicately atop it, towering fully over fourteen feet in height. Mangled metal rebar frizzled out of it like the extravagant blown-glass tentacles of Dale Chihuly; snagged plastic bags rattled in the wind like tawdry Tibetan prayer flags; a few tumbleweeds clung like briars: it was a masterpiece of aleatoric sculpture. A bastard hybrid of highbrow earthworks art and the rapid expediency of a constantly changing combat environment. I noticed a number of platoons taking their group photos in front of it before leaving, so I think it did elicit some popular appeal; it certainly was unavoidable, definitely not obscure. As time dragged on, my thoughts on the sculpture moved from a novelty interest to believe that it could symbolize the operation of Camp Ramadi as whole, and the impersonal nature of institutional change and form. It was a testament to the vagaries of military command policy just as an icicle sculpture by Andy Goldsworthy or sand drawing by Jim Denevan bears witness to the transient whims of Nature.


It goes something like this: a new unit rolls in, hard-charging: they conduct the battle hand-over and by golly they've got to change things. That previous unit got complacent in their last months, and we're going to improve their lazy position--we're not like them! Changing mission requirements, troop surges, reductions, and movements; expanding housing, remodeling facilities, destroying housing, changing units, and so on: the landmark became a repository of all the castaway jetsam of a myriad of plans and lack thereof, calculated "position improvements" and camp restructurings, and so on. At face value the chance sculpture was a pile of trash expediently, randomly formed into an interesting shape, but to me it was a monument to all the myriad rearrangings of Camp Ramadi and the fickle decisions that govern it. I suppose all of this is merely the normal progression of things, and perhaps specious to connect natural change to a perceived hubris in command, but the fact remains that someone finally deemed it necessary to allocate resources to rid the camp of the impertinent eyesore, when it didn't really seem to impede the "progress" or "development" of the camp. My new favorite landmark is not quite so compelling, but a bit more stark: it is the pristine concrete sidewalk constructed at great expense two months ago in front of the Post Exchange; two weeks ago it was barricaded by chain-link fencing in a rash of force protection upgrades.

Generals

The following link is to an article titled "A failure in generalship". The article is superb. Moreover, it articulates a general view held by myself and many of my peers in a serious, scholarly, well-thought way, with sound recommendations for improvement; whereas we typically resort first to satire, then frustration and resignation. Then back to satire. I'm sure this article is much more productive than our lunchtime caricatures.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198

I also believe strongly that the current overall commander in Iraq, General Petraeus, is an exception to the officers described in the article. Tragically, he may have taken charge too late, but I have hope for this war with him at the helm. Also tragically, they moved up his predecessor to Chief of Staff of the Army.

Scoring the Counterinsurgency

This post features commentary on the following editorial:
http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=267664846901795

This editorial rehashes one of the basic premises of a counterinsurgency: tactical success does not equal strategic victory. But if the cynical, manipulative liberal media reported "the truth" (i.e. our ongoing tactical success) and did their part to support the troops, then we could sustain the political will to win the war.

I disagree with the editorial's wholehearted blame of the media. While there are many in the media who use their position to push an agenda, they also respond to demand. They have a readership and they know their market; they know what sells and what people want to read. The American public is interested in American lives affected by the war, for good or for ill, and that's why you see a preponderance of reporting on American tragedies. The administration and military leaders are equally at fault for bungling public expectations and feelings for the war. In one sense, an insurgency is a long-term siege of a nation's political will. When President Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in May of 2003 to declare "Mission Accomplished" to the nation and world, he opened wide a gate for the besieging terrorists. Our wall of credibility sustained a lot of damage. Manipulating patriotism to gain support by sugar-coating, euphemizing, or ignoring what's really going on will eventually backfire, because people do not like being made fools of themselves--it's simple disrespect. For example, not allowing generals to use the word "insurgency" to describe the increasing violence back in 2003 only provoked skepticism and cynicism later on. Anthony Cordesman, a military scholar says this: "...there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn't a matter of a cynical media or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. By the time we finish "spinning," we deprive ourselves of credibility, domestically and internationally." I think what you see in the media is part backlash against this loss of credibility. A classic recent example of this: Senator McCain's publicity stunt two months ago in a Baghdad market. Once the front-runner in the Republican party, since that incident McCain's ratings have dropped.

The other problem with the editorial is their complete reliance on metrics. Keeping score is an over-simplification of the fight. Our task is not to kill more terrorists than they kill Soldiers--there will always be more terrorists. Our job is to protect the people, foster capable and legitimate local security forces to augment and eventually replace undermanned US positions, mentor the legitimate local government to provide rule of law and essential services, and help the local Iraqi government and security forces win popular support to forge a populace resistant to insurgents. At the strategic level, we must help reconcile sectarian rivalry that has stymied government efficacy and wilted public perception and establish government institutions to make things work. Time and time again I've seen bureaucratic bean counters lose the forest for the trees over metrics, stats, and yellow gumballs on PowerPoint slides. I'm not advocating doing away with all metrics, because they are useful and play a role, just consider them in context. In its rush to blame, this editorial fails to keep the big picture in perspective. A great example of this is how the editorial uses numbers to expose the lie that life was better under Saddam. I'm here to say that life was a lot better for Iraqis under Saddam. I know because they tell us this all the time. The fact is those stats are meaningless to your average Iraqi who's dealing with 120 degree heat with no A/C, and thinks that the Shia government has abandoned him, or Sunni car bombs are disrupting his electricity--who is on the fence toward supporting the local police or the local insurgent. My point is that in order to win we're dealing with a precarious, subjective balance of human perception and popular will, which is extremely difficult to quantify. Killing hundreds of terrorists in Al Anbar didn't get us anywhere until we managed to gain the popular support of the local tribes, who brought security to the people, whose actions proved to the people that they offered a better future than dismal uncertainty of random violence. Our success in Ramadi had nothing to do with a body count. "Keeping score" loses sight of what we really need to accomplish, and won't necessarily get us any closer to that objective.

Ugandans

This past month, a troop of Ugandan security guards and their war-profiteering US handlers took Camp Ramadi by storm. It's impossible to get upset with the Ugandans, even though they are very serious and professional about their mission of denying everyone who forgot their ID card that day access to the PX, dining facility, helipad, gym, Camp Ramadi R/C car derby raceway, and other facilities inside the camp. Their broad, serious faces break into such big grins that I can't get upset at them for the inconvenience in the name of force protection they've brought to our lives.

Yet despite their cheeriest smiles, I can't help getting upset. Why are they here? I can't think of any event that triggered the security lockdown on Camp Ramadi. They have to be expensive, because there are a lot of them, not counting the additional living space and infrastructure upgrades we've had to make. There's enough pointless waste around here, I don't like being reminded three or four times daily about the the bundles of taxpayer money that's being dutifully dumped into this thing like landscapers jostle bucketloads of leaves into a leaf shredder. You may think all this money is going to the war, but it's pretty amazing where a lot of it ends up.

SIGACTs

SIGACT is military jargon for significant activity. Like most Army acronyms, it can be juggled to mean different things and morph into various parts of speech. A SIGACT is a concise report of pertinent facts concerning any enemy-focused event that occurs throughout the day. They range from an isolated, harmless sniper shot to a car bomb that kills 20. They can be good news, such as the safe discovery and neutralization of an IED or enemy weapons cache; but are mostly bad, like a successful IED attack that kills a Soldier or Iraqi policeman. Writing them is a critical duty of the tactical operations center--the task force command and control center.


Yesterday, June 8th, there were only two SIGACTs in all of Ramadi and the greater surrounding area. This is astounding. A year ago, Ramadi was a lost cause. It was probably the most dangerous, most lawless city in the world. It routinely grabbed the highest percentage of SIGACTs throughout all Iraq. Yesterday, however, some Marines downtown found a rusty artillery shell and a belt of ammo under a trash pile with a metal detector. Then on the outskirts there was a truck bomb that struck a checkpoint on the highway and badly wounded some Iraqi policemen. But after that, not a single IED exploded, and nobody was shot at, and nothing else was reported. Anywhere. The small cache type finds are still somewhat common--forgotten remnants of the lawless days when insurgents ruled the city. They had weapon and ammunition stocks hidden everywhere to facilitate attacks. They would burst into the homes of citizens and stick their AKs in the faces of the kids to make the father bury artillery shells in the backyard--and keep them from telling us about them. When the Iraqi police finally rolled in and kicked the insurgents out, they brought in these caches by the Ford F-350 truckload. Now the insurgents are out of the city, they've stepped up their VBIED campaign.


Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices--"vee-bids". Now that the IP and the people who love them deny insurgents access to the city, the terrorists changed their tack. Now they infiltrate massive truck bombs targeting innocents and infrastructure. They like to add big tanks of chlorine, but that's just a headline-grab; the chlorine that doesn't evaporate just gives some folks a sore throat for while and gives the media something to yak about. Last week they went for an Iraqna cell phone tower, but ended up destroying five homes and wrecking a few families. The one three days ago that hit a highway patrol station a few klicks outside the base was so large that the concussion knocked down ceiling tiles and filled the on-base gym with dust--it destroyed my workout and wounded some patrolmen (one lost a leg), but luckily no one was killed except the driver.

These attacks are senseless. They're like the Nazi buzz-bombs over London at the end of WWII. A big middle finger to the people of Ramadi who are starting to enjoy water and electricity again for the first time in years. They're an Al Qaeda ploy to prove to the people that they can still control their lives. The city is getting wise, though, and a new rule by the mayor and other tactics will hopefully push these attacks further outside the densely populated areas. It is easy to see how willing the people are to suffer major inconveniences for security--waiting in long lines at checkpoints, Iraqi Army and police clearing their homes again: they don't want another VBIED to detonate in their local market. Impinges on certain civil liberties are easy to bear when the alternative is rampant violence and arbitrary destruction.

But now, the people are starting to come to terms with the uneasy peace over Ramadi right now. A few days ago our neighborhood of Ramadi had their first soccer tournament on a new field. City municipal workers are coming out of the woodwork and fixing water pipes and electrical lines on their own now that they won't get sniped at, kidnapped, or beheaded for doing so. It's kind of unfortunate we don't have positive SIGACTs: official reports that tabulate every time some kids had a soccer game without getting offered 10 bucks and some candy to put a bomb in a hole where humvees drive, or when we finally removed all the concrete barriers and concertina wire barring all the storefronts (now open) along a former IED alley, or when the municipal workers tested the local water tower and found out--amazingly--that it had no bullet holes and didn't leak like a giant colander on stilts. But that might make things too hectic in the TOC again--no one wants to go back to the time when there were 40-50 SIGACTs per day.

Big Red One

I have spent my entire, brief Army career in the 1st Infantry Division--the "Big Red One." Though I've had brief regrets about not being in an Airborne or Alpine unit, I am generally proud of being in the 1st Infantry Division. We have an illustrious history starting back in WWI, and we are the Army's oldest, continually serving combat unit. When the division headquarters moved back to Germany in 1996, they adopted the Army's Class A unit patch--a maraschino cherry red '1' on a shield crest of foliage green for the normal duty (camouflage) uniform to signify that we were an "expeditionary force" (ie. serving overseas). This was an anomaly; no other unit in the Army had this privilege (everyone else wears a subdued patch to fit the camouflage). When the rest of the division moved back to the States last year, my brigade, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, remained the surviving expeditionary force, and we proudly kept our Big Red One patches on.


Last month, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army apparently caught wind that we were the lone brigade in the Army wearing Class A patches. He sent an indignant order down to the rogue brigade to cease wearing the offending patch on 1 June. Now, figuring two new subdued "Big Black One" patches for each Soldier in the brigade (a few thousand), at roughly 5-7 dollars a patch, this decision will cost US taxpayers roughly $30,000 to supply the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with the authorized patch--not to mention the pre-deployment investment of red one patches on a field of teal to match the Army's new high-tech digital camouflage uniform. The thing is, roughly six months from now we're going to "re-flag" as a different unit under the Army's plan to reorganize forces in Germany, and put on a brand new patch. The other thing is, the Army supply system couldn't move fast enough to match the fiat, so now we're patchless for the unforseeable future. If I'm lucky, I should get a big black one patch from the Army system as a souvenir before I leave Iraq.

To Survive or To Win?

There is a pervasive lack of understanding concerning the type of conflict we’re in among the junior leaders and soldiers fighting the war on the front lines, and this is absolutely not their fault. You can’t even put the onus on the chain of command or even the highest leaders of the military; though as time passes, pressure should mount on our senior military leaders for allowing ignorance and misconception to exist in our junior leaders, those on the ground calling the shots. This pervasive sentiment typically takes two forms: ignorance of the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, and a mistaken pessimism that certain Arabic cultural traits render all our idealistic efforts into a costly, pointless death grind. This mindset causes the majority of junior leaders and the Soldiers or Marines under them to care about only one thing: survival—not winning; maybe at best doing some good where they can, but not making lasting transitional changes. The issue is simply that junior leaders across the military are not prepared or properly trained for the type of war they are fighting.


In a recent mass-email home, a Lieutenant on the front lines wrote eloquently of the Ranger Creed, applying this tried and true Army maxim to his current situation, and yet it doesn't seem to fit: “We have no ‘Ranger objective.’” he wrote. “We have no hill to take, no terrain to dominate, no land which, once captured, will be safe haven for us.” He’s exactly right: there is no land to take. Enemy centers of gravity are not terrain, as they are in conventional, linear battle—they are rather complex and amorphous networks of people and information that mitigate our overwhelming firepower, and they are the nebulous, abstract mist of human attitudes and perceptions in the people. Of course there’s an objective, only it takes more than intestinal fortitude to conquer—it requires historical perspective, cultural understanding, patience, and cunning. And it will not be taken in battle; it will gradually, imperceptibly be achieved over the course of years. While it is one thing to talk glibly of the “nature of counterinsurgency,” it is an entirely different matter to train a soldier or marine how to fight one, to equip a leader with a contextual framework and cultural understanding to truly offensively prosecute a counterinsurgency. You don’t necessarily win in this war by firing your tank and taking a bunker, like every soldier and marine has been trained superbly to do—though those skills are important and do play a role. Instead, we are relying on junior leaders to figure it out without the rigorous training in this other type of warfare. What did my unit do immediately prior to deployment? Ship out Grafenwoehr Training Area for two weeks to fire our tanks, artillery cannons, and Bradley fighting vehicles at the range. What do we really need? A few Staff Sergeants who can de-escalate a situation with some cultural savvy and knowledge of a few key Arabic phrases, and a Lieutenant armed with some nuanced negotiating skills.

Many junior leaders (and others) believe that Iraq is hopeless because of various cultural, tribal, or religious traits. Can democracy succeed where “…forgiveness brings shame, and personal vengeance is justice?” as one Lieutenant put it. Maybe so, but I think what he’s describing is the human condition without the rule of law, not a tragic character flaw peculiar to the Arabs. This is a poverty and war stricken land—the people display a normal level of pathological victimization for a people crushed by a dictator whose oppressive yet relatively stable society and infrastructure was devastated by years of sanctions and an invasion of 70-ton tanks and unnumbered explosives. But the people thirst for justice, too, and rule of law is something they yearn for. It will take years, of course, but we're not helping by throwing our hands up and saying it can’t be done, denying it’s our problem, or harping about how this whole debacle was a mistake to begin with. Is each death of a US Servicemember an embarrassment to our nation's collective shortsightedness? That really remains to be seen. I suppose these deaths could very well become an embarrassment: not necessarily because the decision to invade was based on faulty intelligence, but probably due to our nation's insatiable fast-food desire to see success in terms of 2-4 year political intervals and an unwillingness to witness democracy at its bloody, turmoiled roots. We’re the 20th century looking back 200 years ago at ourselves, expecting them to catch up right now to where we’re at, and if they won’t, then let’s get out of dodge, because it’s no longer our responsibility.

To the military’s credit, leaders at all echelons are trying hard to fight this war the right way. Senior leaders have established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq, and the latest enemy tactics and current tactical scenarios have made their way into the military’s training centers; the Army has recently published a field manual for counterinsurgency, and the Marines have republished their classic Small Wars Manual that went forgotten during Vietnam. It may be too little too late. The counterinsurgency academy is focused at the battalion staff and company commander level and above, and does not yet integrate NCOs and junior leaders—those paying the toll every day. Scenario training is good for decisive tactical decision making, but doesn't equip a leader with the contextual understanding they need to be proactive prosecutors of this complex war, and to recognize the political significance of tactical decisions. Since the beginning of the war, leaders at all echelons have had one goal constantly in mind: bring their Soldiers home safely. Survival mode is easy—especially when confronted with the unknown. The tragedy is that survival mode is often counterproductive and not focused on facilitating an end to this interminable conflect.
Historically renowned for creativity and intrepidity in battle, hundreds of brave young leaders are figuring out on their own how to fight this war the right way. Unfortunately, relying on the creativity of insufficiently trained leaders is somewhat of a crapshoot. Some units get it, and see incredible success, such as the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi; all too often others don’t because they're too busy treading water, simply trying to survive.

Goat Grab

To get the Sheiks on your side, you must use tribal diplomacy: cigarettes, chai, chit-chat, long silences you might call awkward, communal goat platters. Negotiating a simple contract for some gravel back at the base is not a concise power-deal brokered in ten minutes. It involves copious small talk, cups of chai, and more cigarettes--then a few minutes of business, in low casual tones while lounging on a a plush pillow or two.

We go out to the Sheiks' compound and sit for hours, declining countless cigarettes and sipping cloying chai and acrid coffee. I especially like the coffee. The coffee server brings it out in an ornate samovar with two small cups, and makes the rounds to everyone. You get a small shot, like espresso. When you pass the cup back to the server you have to give it a little wiggle, which means no more, if you don't do the wiggle, they'll pour you another. Eventually they bring out the Quzi--giant platters of rice mounded with boiled goat and sheep parts, with layers of flat bread and bowls of savory tomato-based broth and vegetables. In a touching gesture of accomodation, they put our platter on a table instead of the floor and bring out spoons, but I am trying hard to eat properly with my hands. The trick is to first tear out the choice pieces of meat and maneuver them to your little corner of the platter. Then you tightly mound clumps of rice and meat together with your four fingers and scoop it up to your mouth, holding it in place with your thumb. It should hold together--although a few pieces still drop from my rice clumps. Then, sliding your fingers up to your mouth, you must deftly and cleanly push the mound into your mouth with the back of your thumb. True masters keep their unsanitary left hand behind their backs during the whole process (although it is allowed to use one's left hand to tear chunks of flatbread and also to dissassemble the meat), but I have to keep it under my right hand to catch rice bits and broth drippings. I'm getting better, though, and have even received some compliments. I plan to teach my kids this technique along with learning chopsticks, because it is a practical way to eat, and much of the world prefers it or uses it out of necessity. The other very tricky thing is scooping up broth with the flat bread--something I need to watch closely at the next goat grab. It is very polite to dig around in the middle of platter for a choice morsel and place it in your guest's territory on the platter; the highest of compliments to feed him that choice morsel yourself, or to slap it greasily in his palm. The Arabs make a good point about eating with one's hands, though: you never know for certain if the silverware is clean, but you do know for certain that your own hands are clean.

One reason we've been successful in our area is that my unit genuinely likes hanging out with these guys. We have a great rapport; my commander even holds a lot of wasta--or influence--with the Sheiks and the local community at large, and a main part of it is because we spend time at the goat grab. Politically, we have made a lot of headway with these Sheiks. Whole tribes in the area have gone from being insurgents to Iraqi Police. The Sheiks like having our commander over to banquets because they introduce him to their friends in the community in a familiar environment. The Sheiks told us they like to show their friends he's just a normal person too, and that he wants the best for the community.

Ramadi

This first entry is a testament to my procrastinating nature. I had grand plans to start this upon arriving in Kuwait for my second combat tour on August 5, 2006. It is now over nine months later. I am writing this blog at first for myself--mainly to keep up a writing discipline; secondly, because I know most of you reading this are interested in what is going on here, probably especially my part in it. As such, please feel free to ask me questions, as this will provide me some content.

In case you came about this blog indirectly, or don't know me personally, I am an Army Captain currently stationed at Camp Ramadi. I work for a Task Force (battalion-size element). Our area of operations encompasses a chunk of Ramadi as well as some surrounding countryside.

Following are some recent media articles that offer a decent perspective of what is currently going on in Ramadi. The first article lays out the general context for Ramadi's current success, while the others specifically mention my unit. My view of the situation is this: some courageous Iraqis decided to take responsibility, and luckily enough (for them and for us), we had an Army unit that was intelligent enough to embrace them, and wise enough to not mold the Iraqi's initiative into their own narrow image of what a pro-US Iraqi movement had to look like. The lion's share of the credit goes to the Al Anbar Salvation Council, however, as you'll see from the articles.

"An Army Colonel's gamble pays off in Iraq" - Jim Michaels, USA Today
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-colonel_N.htm

"In what was once one of Iraq's deadliest cities, local police curb violence" - Todd Pitman, AP
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20070413-1241-iraq-policingramadi.html

"In Ramadi, a ragtag solution with real results" - Chris Kraul, LA Times
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-kidcops7may07,0,4179768.story?coll=la-home-headlines

"Soldier and sheik like brothers against Al Qaeda" - Moni Basu, Atlanta Journal-Constitution
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/georgiansatwar/entries/2007/04/29/soldier_and_sheik_like_brother.html