Headed Home

Early this morning (November 17th, 2007), I finally landed in Kuwait. After a few days or so of personnel out-processing, I'll be on my way back to Germany after spending the last fifteen months and two weeks in the Middle East. Fifteen months is too long of a time away from those you love. What makes it especially difficult is the Army's steadfast dedication to stripping away any semblance of predictability or give straight answers regarding our timeline throughout the deployment. To summarize: we deployed in August; we were supposed to come home in June 2007, then August 2007, then early October 2007, then late October 2007, and now, finally November 2007. I'd very much like to give the military the benefit of the doubt on this front: I know there are all kinds of exceedingly complicated decisions and a multitude of variables and contingencies involved with the herculean task of managing troop levels and movements. But on the other hand, senior leaders in the Army just do not seem to understand that the only thing a Soldier's spouse or mom wants to hear is when are they coming home. Families know they can't expect an exact date, but continually deferring hopes on this point over the course of fifteen months simply frustrates and demoralizes them. Furthermore, in the case of my Task Force in Ramadi, we were complete with all combat operations by 11 October. Why are we just now flying home a month and a half later? Once again, I'd like to give the Army the benefit of the doubt, but without a single adequate attempt at a justification or rationale for this five week delay by the chain of command, Soldiers and junior leaders are left to stew in their own cynical conclusions or assumptions.

At about fourteen months (mid-September), the constant drag of the deployment caught up to me--like running away from a fixed point attached to a giant elastic band. We were simultaneously handing over our area of operations in western Ramadi to a Marine battalion while preparing for a large-scale clearance operation far to Ramadi's north partnered with the Iraqi Army. Our mission was to support their clearance of a lawless expanse of land along the eastern shore of the Thar Thar Reservoir (the large body of water right in the middle of Iraq). The key aspect of the mission was to complete the initial force protection of a combat outpost for the Iraqi Army so they could maintain a permanent presence in the area, partnered with another US Army unit. The mission was a great success: we (with Iraqi Army in the lead) found numerous caches and IEDs, and detained a few insurgents. The particular area has been one of Al Qaeda's strategic bastions for the past few years: situated along a key route between Salah ad Din and Al Anbar provinces (the main road runs from Fallujah to Samarra), and close enough to provide a base of support to Baghdad. The new operating base will fully disrupt insurgent operations in this key area, and greatly contribute to the security of Fallujah, Ramadi, and hopefully Baghdad; it will also cut down on the notorious hijacking of civilian Iraqis that has occurred in that region for a long time. Best of all, no one from our battalion was seriously hurt or killed.

Suffice to say, this was our largest operation of the deployment. Preparations were detailed and stressful, with about a week of living on edge in the desert. It was a deep moment of relief to return safe and successful to Camp Ramadi. And then I was done. The tension of fourteen months reached its limit, and without the propulsion of external action, ennui set in. So I spent the past five weeks stretching five days worth of redeployment work activity into a month, haphazardly studying for the GRE, loafing, and booking a sweet second honeymoon to Barcelona with Robin that I now have to cancel because the Air Force couldn't manage to bring me home on schedule (but really it's my fault). I also did not care to update my blog for those few who manage to read it. I'm sorry to those of you who were wondering what was going on and hoping for an update. I tentatively plan on periodically commenting on various aspects of the War from my perspective, and if any of you have something particular you are wondering about, feel free to post here or email me at david.h.bradley@us.army.mil. It's been a long war for Robin and I, and I'm ready to spend some time at home.

Solar-Powered Street Lights

It is official. The US Army brigade in Ramadi has now spent $1.94 million on solar-powered street lights. Or, more accurately, the Army has spent $1.94 million attempting to light up Ramadi with solar-powered street lights.


The saga of the solar-powered street lights began late this Spring when the provincial government featured a modest project for new street lights in the downtown area of the war damaged city. The solar-powered lights were to be an interim solution until the Ramadi director general (DG) of municipalities was able to repair or replace the preexisting street lights in the city as electricity service improved to the region. The military pounced on this brilliant plan, aiming to exploit it throughout the city. Starting as murmur, soon echoes of "Solar lights, solar lights, solar lights?? Solar Lights!" reverberated through the shabby concrete halls and into makeshift wooden cubicles, wafted over the radios, and permeated emails, spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slides. Somehow the very future of the city rested in the flourishing of solar-powered street lights. Maybe Iraqis too can learn to have the moral self-satisfaction of having Green public works initiatives. Within a month, Iraqi municipal workers, contractors, and engineers were bustling around the city developing pricey scopes of work and contracts for the ravenous military demand for more solar-powered street lights.


The first completed run of solar-powered street lights amounted to nothing more than a glowstick atop a shoddy fifteen foot pole. Another strip of sixty had only ten functional lights. The Iraqi DGs (director generals--municipal officials) wonder about our zealous adoption of a temporary solution, when already the electricity service is improving to the point when the existing infrastructure should be repaired. But we are paying out--solar lights are lucrative. It's a wonder the municipal employees don't quit working for the city to come build solar lights for the US Army. It was a point of personal pride in our unit that we had successfully stymied any installation of solar-powered street lights in our area of operations during our tenure.


UPDATE: I thought I had escaped the solar-powered street lights once and for all after leaving Ramadi. Not so. Camp Virginia, Kuwait has scores of gorgeous solar-powered streetlights (about eight feet apart, too). Being so closely spaced, they make superb road markers; illumination, however, comes from the noisy, gas-powered generator light systems placed along each row of solar-powered street lights.

Sheik Sittar Albu Resha Assassinated

It was to be my pleasure to write today of two remarkable events: the city of Ramadi's 5k Run: a triumphant competition held in the heart of the city, with over 200 enthusiastic Iraqi participants--a stunning return to somewhat normal life; and also of a sizable delegation of Shiite tribal leaders from the South who just a few days ago sojourned to Ramadi to praise and thank the leaders of the Sunni Anbar Awakening for inspiring their own tribal awakening movement, and to express unity and solidarity in the face of the debilitating sectarianism that has riven Iraq. Tragically, these heartening events have been entirely overshadowed by the treacherous assassination of Sheik Sittar Bezea Ftykhan Albu Resha, charismatic figurehead and galvanizing force behind the Al Anbar Awakening, leader of Iraq's quickly growing political party advocating unity and reconciliation, and source of great hope to any Iraqi aspiring to defy Al Qaeda's insidious grip on the nation.

Will Sheik Sittar become a martyr and shock the people into an even deeper and more earnest effort to rid the region of Al Qaeda, or will it frighten those working for the good and foreshadow the return of Al Qaeda's mystique of fear and control? As for Ramadi, and perhaps Al Anbar, I believe the former case will hold true. Yet I can't help but realize, painfully, that the glimmer of hope Sheik Sittar and his awakening brought to the possibility of national reconciliation has been dimmed. Speaking selfishly, I only wish the perpetrators had procrastinated until our departure, allowing us time to emotionally divest ourselves before succeeding with the single greatest act that could ruin all the impossible gains we have experienced first hand in our year in Ramadi.

Cognitive Dissonance

Military strategist Max Boot has a lucid and sobering article in Commentary Magazine about the possibilities for our continued involvement in Iraq:

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10920&page=all

I personally fully agree with his conclusions from a strategic perspective, and the optimist in me along with what I've experienced first-hand in Ramadi believes it is our best shot and also even possible. It seems to me Mr Boot charts the best course of any commentator thus far, even if he does so by drawing out the wretched alternatives to the surge and the current strategy. However, from my perspective, I'm not so sure he has adequately addressed the strain on the military--especially the Army. From what I've seen, most junior officers are already getting out. Fifteen month deployments are difficult to bear for equipment and personnel, especially in a counterinsurgency where tangible results are nearly impossible to quantify, and a tactical success may not guarantee your buddy won't die in a suicide vest attack the next day. For any soldier you might find who wants to stay and "finish the job," you'll find another simply trying to figure out what that job is he is trying to finish, or another who is just trying to survive another day.

I confess I have cognitive dissonance about the war. Though I think we must stay the course and finish what we started, I surely don't want that person finishing the job to be me if I can help it.

Safety is Our #1 Concern

Everyone on Camp Ramadi is feeling a lot more safe today. A number of initiatives have been established recently that have noticeably improved base security. The base management unit has been setting up checkpoints around Camp Ramadi to make sure people are wearing their seat belts and not speeding--and also making sure people are wearing their flak vest and Kevlar helmets while driving in humvees from their barracks to the Post Exchange or laundry point on the camp. A lot of Soldiers and Marines hadn't been doing that, but this initiative will truly ensure that those accidents that never happened previously won't occur in the future either. One unit was stopped for speeding while taking a casualty to the medical clinic; they hopefully learned the error of their ways. Their carelessness could have easily made a bad situation much worse.

Family and friends back home can rest assured knowing their loved ones are safer than ever thanks to the scrupulous tax dollar investments toward force protection upgrades made in the past month. Hundreds of thick concrete barriers now line the roads around post to keep the humvees from veering off into the thick dust. Dust clouds can reduce visibility in an instant and make you cough. A few of these countless barriers also protect a couple vital structures from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. Although impossible, it can be conceived that one of these vehicles and drivers could pass completely undetected through the triple tiered base entrance security checks and gates.

Lastly, I feel palpably more at ease in our camp dining facility after yesterday. All non-Department of Defense personnel (Arabs and Indians) now have their own entrance line at the dining facility where they are individually searched by the ubiquitous Ugandans. Even though our unit interpreters endanger their lives daily alongside the troops, have been shot by snipers, been blown up by IEDs, had their families threatened and harassed, provided first aid for wounded Soldiers, and so on, when they get on post, you simply can't trust them--even after having undergone extensive background checks, routine security screening interviews, and receiving color-coded access badges. When I saw how many pocket knives the guards had confiscated in the first day alone I was flabbergasted. Fifty of these Sri Lankan laundry workers and Jordanian interpreters were carrying concealed weapons right under our noses! That many men could have easily overpowered me and my 9mm Beretta should I have been the lone Soldier dining with dozens of suddenly fanatical contractors armed with whittling knives. Even some of the Iraqi interpreters I know had the umbrage to complain to me about the safety measures, so I set them straight. They had no gratitude for the vast improvement to their own personal safety. I personally think we could improve our situation even more by requiring all Muslims on base to sew green crescents onto their shirt sleeves. Then I could sleep just a bit sweeter at night.

Safety is our number one concern here on Camp Ramadi. Rest assured your tax money is put to good use; your family members are secure.

Ramadi in the Press, Part II

Last Sunday, my unit found itself on the front page of the Washington Post with a rollicking story about the "Battle of Donkey Island."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/18/AR2007081801270.html?hpid=topnews
(Washington Post may require you to login their site in order to view the article (it's free, but a hassle). MSN removed their link to the story).

As far as narrative goes, it's a great tale of the bravery and intrepidity of the Soldiers in my unit. They did an amazing job, and there were many stories of loyalty and courage that didn't make the cut. One of note: when Sergeant First Class Buchan was shot, one of our interpreters fought alongside the platoon and was the first to respond to his injuries and try to keep him alive. Many of our interpreters are the most loyal, valiant people in the fight. They get paid hardly anything, work away from the families much longer than even we do, are victimized by asinine suspicion-mongering "base security" policies, are directly threatened and risk their families being threatened.

Unfortunately, this inspiring war story is marred by a few sentences hinting at possible violation of the rules of engagement (war crimes) and some unhelpful, simplistic commentary at the end. It's difficult to comment on what the reporter writes in reference to killing wounded enemy combatants, especially involving my unit. I'm in the uncomfortable position of not quite being able to say it isn't true, not able to confirm the reporter likely took liberties with the story, not able to adequately explain the confusion of a violent firefight at night involving an entrenched enemy fighting to the death. I can with reasonable confidence say, barring any unfortunate revelations, that according to numerous sworn statements and a unofficial yet detailed report on the battle, that the Soldiers acquitted themselves honorably, bravely, and legally. However, maybe a few Soldiers got carried away with unsupervised, one-upping war stories to the reporter .

At the end of the article, the reporter attempts to summarize opposing viewpoints and in doing so sets up a false dichotomy. I think this is common in journalists looking to report differing perspectives; in reality they fabricate these differing opinions themselves. Here, the reporter posits that commanders are touting the battle as a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, while troops on the ground seem to think otherwise--that there was no decisive victory and that Al Qaeda is strong enough to muster a similar attack at any time, and could easily overpower the local Iraqi security force if we left. Well, both sides are obviously right, and don't really have anything to argue about. They are simply different answers to different questions juxtaposed out of context to construct opposing viewpoints. The fact remains this battle was a decisive victory against Al Qaeda, and yet, despite the Iraqi police's enthusiasm, they aren't ready to defend the city on their own. Despite our tragic loss, Al Qaeda's strategic level counter-offensive against the city that turned on them utterly failed, and sent them reeling for a while in the region. We also foiled another catastrophic attempt soon after Donkey Island involving multiple truck bombs. Since then there have been no significant offensives to retake the city, but Al Qaeda has surely learned their lesson and will likely not attempt the same methods. So yes--it was a significant victory of Al Qaeda, and yes--the burgeoning Iraqi Police and government in Ramadi need more time to become truly self-sufficient. Al Qaeda may be on their heels, but are still capable of inflicting serious set-backs. Our gains must be secured.

* * *

This link is to a recent newsbrief by Kevin Drum of CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/24/politics/animal/main3201627.shtml

It is a trenchant and completely accurate summary of the Al Anbar Awakening during a time when it seems military leaders are clamoring to take the credit for turning Al Anbar. Unfortunately, this concise summary of the Awakening runs amok with frivolous assertions and implications at the end. Here is the last paragraph (with commentary in italics): "The Anbar Awakening is genuinely good news, but (a) it had nothing to do with the surge (true), (b) it's happening only in homogeneous Sunni areas (mostly true, but not necessarily--the Awakening has inspired tribal leaders in mixed areas that they can indeed stand up to Al Qaeda's bloody thuggery, and some tribal leaders have Sunni and Shia in their tribe, so it is in their best interest to encourage tribal unity. There is evidence of this in Salah ad Din and Diyala already, but it remains to be seen if it will succeed as in Anbar or not), and (c) it involves arming and training Sunni forces who are almost certain to turn against both us and the Shiite central government as soon as they've finished off AQI. (Completely false, and a wild speculation. The Awakening political party (SAI)--now the most prominent in Al Anbar--is the only political party in Iraq to unabashedly support the Coalition, indeed thus far it is one of the party's foundational points. Additionally, all the Sunni Iraqi Police in Ramadi were hired and equipped by the Shia Ministry of the Interior. At least in Ramadi, nearly all IP support SAI. There are concerns that various Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad, former insurgents, will turn on us and the government after Al Qaeda is defeated, but this is a worst case scenario. Al Qaeda is the single largest destabilizing factor in Iraq--they drive the rank-and-file to the militias for protection and prevent political reconciliation from occurring. If Al Qaeda is defeated, we are on the right track. The shady Sunni groups may well be amenable to political reconciliation if Al Qaeda is neutralized. However, I'm pretty sure that if we do a complete pullout ASAP, and Iraq descends into even more lawless chaos, that the Sunni Police here will defend their land against Shia incursion, but at that point there won't really be any "central government".)

* * *

This last link is to an interesting op-ed in the New York Times written by some enlisted Soldiers in the 82nd Airborne. It doesn't involve Ramadi, but I think it is fascinating simply because of the writers--Soldiers typically do not sound so erudite, nor do they often feel compelled to make their opinions of the strategic realm known outside their chain of command. Also, it is an extremely well-articulated viewpoint of many soldiers that one does not often hear: disillusioned and confused about their mission--which is susceptible to units especially in Baghdad (see my post on surviving vs. winning about this). Their description of the quagmire of Baghdad is a visceral, boots on the ground perspective abetted with an intelligent higher level perspective. However, being in Ramadi, I simply can't support the idea that for the people of Iraq to "regain their self-respect" they will declare us an occupying force. After taking pains to develop a nuanced picture of Baghdad's complexity, that assertion is a simplistic generalization that simply doesn't apply to large swaths of the country. While I do agree with their recommendation to force the Iraqis to be increasingly self-reliant given our American need to try to do everything for them, we can't forget that this sort of mentality was previously adopted toward the Iraqi Police and resulting lack of oversight allowed many units to be infiltrated by militia elements. Mainly, the article makes me sincerely grateful to be in Ramadi.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?pagewanted=1

Ramadi in the Press

Recently, Ramadi has received some noteworthy coverage in the press that I'd like to comment on.

The following article is from Der Spiegel, basically Germany's version of Time. It's a high profile, highly respected magazine that has been fiercely critical of the US in Iraq. Which makes the article featured here all the more noteworthy. While the section on Ramadi only takes up the first part, I think as a whole this lengthy article is probably one of the best summaries of the situation in Iraq. It pulls no punches with problems, such as the way the administration has continually self-mutilated its own credibility, ongoing sectarian violence, or the way the military (really, the Army) is stretching further to the breaking point; yet it also clearly demonstrates the tenuous, slowly growing hope that this crooked ship might somehow right itself, or at least not sink. It acknowledges the success with the failure; it shows that an immediate pullout is a fool's errand; and it also questions where this whole problem is going. The section on Ramadi features one of our company commanders in a neighborhood where in January we had two soldiers killed and a few injured. In fact we would not even drive down some of the streets because they were laden with deeply buried bombs. The same friendly folks mentioned in the article were uncommunicative and unhelpful--sullen or frightened--seven to eight months ago. The encouraging facts the article cites are straight from our Task Force records. It is a good thing to see the remarkable success here in our area juxtaposed with the mayhem in Baghdad, and the big picture perspective from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker combined with detailed, tactical views. I think it's one of the more balanced reports out there.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html




This next article was published in the Wall Street Journal, and managed to make the front page. While I think it's great that Ramadi's success has made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, from my perspective this article can be a bit misleading. I have two signifcant qualms about this article and most other positive reports from Ramadi: the amount of undue credit we like to grab for ourselves, and the simplistic cause-and-effect type analysis that limits the scope and time this turnaround has taken. Take for instance this quote: "The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders... The progress here, which has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model." The first and last sentence drive home the underlying subtext: that our campaign plan and efforts deserve the credit for this astonishing success. The 'U.S. campaign' and the 'Marine model' are off-handedly referred to as if the U.S. military were solely responsible for devising and bringing about a revolutionary strategy (involving bundles of cash) that overturned the region. It's the first assumption of the reporter and taken for granted throughout the article.

What is this "Marine model" he refers to anyway? The Marine campaign plan since we first arrived here last fall has been to prop up and defend (with the lives of Marines and Soldiers) the constitutional "legitimate" provincial government--a tiny cabal of cronies and opportunists despised by the general populace. In fact, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, our higher headquarters when we arrived, had to ditch the worthless Marine model by wooing the Sheiks and building a trust and friendship with them over the course of months (for more on this reference the USA Today article linked in my first blog entry). Additionally, the tribal leaders generally come across as a group that can be bought or easily manipulated with cold hard cash. Prominent Iraq news website IraqSlogger summarizes the article: "how the U.S. was able to court the Anbar sheikhs into turning against al Qaeda. How? Money, and lots of it." There is no denying ongoing reconstruction efforts and lucrative contracts are maintaining the current stability, but the article portrays Sheiks as greedy moochers. We've been throwing money into Al Anbar for years now with nothing to show for it except indebtedness to China. The key event that the article glosses over is when "Sheik Sattar quietly approached the U.S. about forming and alliance to fight al Qaeda. His tribe saw an alliance with U.S. forces as a means to gain power." I can't say this statement isn't true, but it fails to accurately portray what really happened, and reinforces the subtext of tribes as pliable and us as willing paymasters. The truth is that Sheik Sattar unified the local tribes on his own. Fortunately, the Army unit at the time spent the painstaking hours building trust and rapport with the Sheiks, so when they made their decision, it was easy for them to come to the Army.

I get really frustrated with our quickness to congratulate ourselves out here. It's really not so simple. The fact my unit has done so well is simply because we came in at the right time, and our task force commander had the time, patience, and concern to continue the right relationships with the tribal leaders. We could just have easily come into the pointless death grind of Ramadi just like the many units before us--which is what we would have walked into if the local tribes hadn't decided fight Al Qaeda first.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html